BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Further Develop a Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework for Electric and Gas Utilities.	Rulemaking 20-07-013 (Filed on July 16, 2020)

(NOT CONSOLIDATED)

Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (U 39 M) to Submit Its 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report. U 39 M)	A.20-06-012 (Filed on June 30, 2020)
Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company for Authority, Among Other Things, to Increase Rates and Charges for Electric and Gas Service Effective on January 1, 2023. (U 39 M)	A.21-06-021 (Filed on June 30, 2021)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U39M) 2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH DECISION 19-04-020 AND DECISION 21-11-009

WILLIAM MANHEIM
STEVEN W. FRANK

Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street, B30A
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 971-5091
Facsimile: (415) 973-5520
E-Mail: steven.frank@pge.com

Attorneys for
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

Dated: April 1, 2022

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OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U39M) 2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH DECISION 19-04-020 AND DECISION 21-11-009

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) hereby submits its 2021 Safety Performance Metrics Report in Compliance with California Public Utilities Commission Decision 19-04-020 and Decision 21-11-009. This is PG&E's third annual report on its Safety Performance Metrics.

The report is provided as Attachment 1.

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Respectfully Submitted,

By: */s/ Steven W. Frank*
STEVEN W. FRANK

Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 971-5091
Facsimile: (415) 972-5520
E-Mail: steven.frank@pge.com

Attorney for
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

Dated: April 1, 2022

ATTACHMENT 1

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION DECISION 19-04-020 and DECISION 21-11-009

APRIL 1, 2022

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

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2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

I. Introduction

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) submits its 2021 Safety Performance Metrics Report (SPMR) in compliance with Decision (D.) 19-04-020 and D.21-11-009 concerning the Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework proceeding, Rulemaking 20-07-013. The purpose of the SPMR is to provide the Commission and interested parties information on PG&E's performance related to key safety metrics.

Safety is PG&E's most important responsibility. Our customers and communities deserve the assurance that we will deliver their electricity and natural gas safely and reliably. That is the fundamental role of any utility company, and one that PG&E takes seriously.

PG&E is committed to continuing to improve the safety of our workforce and the public. Benchmarking and safety metrics are measured and analyzed to drive the right behavior as we continue to strengthen our safety efforts. PG&E monitors our progress with a focus on leading indicators as well as lagging metrics to show our progress over time. This helps PG&E identify and address the underlying causes of safety incidents to prevent them from reoccurring.

The information in this SPMR confirms areas where PG&E has shown significant safety progress over the past decade. At the same time, as shown in other data points, we have more work to do.

Our focus is on building an accountable, transparent organization that embraces raising issues and ideas to further the cause of safety. We look forward to demonstrating, through our actions, that we are working every day toward improved outcomes. We know that restoring trust can only come through sustained performance and accountability. The people who rely on us need to see that we are continuing to reduce risks in every corner of our system.

a. Background:

Pursuant to D.19-04-020, for its 2019 and 2020 reporting years, PG&E reported performance against 25 Safety Performance Metrics, including providing up to 10 years of historical data.

On November 9, 2021, through the Commission's robust and transparent Risk Based Decision Making Framework rulemaking process that began on November 17, 2020, the Commission approved D.21-11-009 approving 32 existing, updated, and new SPMs. Accordingly, in this SPMR, PG&E is providing metric data for the following 32 metrics:

1) Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Overhead Wires Down Non-Major Event Days;
2) T&D Overhead Wires Down – Major Event Days (MED);
3) Electric Emergency Response Time;
4) Fire Ignitions;
5) Gas Dig-In;
6) Gas In-Line Inspection (ILI);
7) Gas In-Line Upgrade;
8) Gas Shut-in Time – Mains;
9) Gas Shut-in Time – Services;
10) Cross Bore Intrusions;
11) Gas Emergency Response Time;
12) Natural Gas Storage Baseline Inspections Performed;
13) Gas System Internal Inspection Status;
14) Employee Days Away, Restricted and Transfer (DART) Rate;
15) Rate of SIF Actual (Employee);
16) Rate of SIF Actual (Contractor);
17) Rate of SIF Potential (Employee);
18) Rate of SIF Potential (Contractor);
19) Contractor DART Rate;
20) Public Serious Injuries and Fatalities (SIF);
21) Helicopter/ Flight Accident or Incident;
22) Percentage of Serious Injury and Fatality Corrective Actions Completed on Time;
23) Hard Brake Rate;
24) Driver's Call Complaint Rate;
25) Wires-Down not resulting in Automatic De-energization;
26) Missed Inspections and Patrols for Electric Circuits;

27) Overhead Conductor Size in High Fire Threat District Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD;
28) Gas Operation Corrective Actions Backlog;
29) GO-95 Corrective Actions (Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD);
30) Gas Overpressure Events;
31) Gas In-Line Inspections Missed; and
32) Overhead Conductor Safety Index.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

SECTION 2

METRIC DATA EXAMPLES

II. Metric Data Examples

Prior to the SPMR, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) tracked many of these metrics because they provide valuable insight on our safety performance. As required in Decision (D.) 19-04-020, PG&E provides three to five examples of how PG&E uses these metric data to (1) improve staff or contractor training and/or take corrective actions aimed at minimizing top risks or risk drivers; and (2) to support risk-based decision-making.

a) Wires Down: Informs Risk-Based Decision Making: Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Overhead Wires Down data is used to inform the Overhead Primary Deteriorated Conductor Replacement program. The program centralizes the prioritization, tracking, and funding of conductor replacement projects in non-high fire threat district (HFTD) areas and targets replacement of primary conductor segments with elevated wires down rates, especially small conductor and overlap of corrosion zones.

The program is informed with the Wires Down Database which tracks high priority replacement attributes about the conductor (such as size, type, known splices, annealing, etc.) as well as environmental factors and risks (such as corrosion zone, snow loading zone, and HFTD). These attributes and factors are used to determine conductor replacement project initiation, justification, and priority, as well as to determine failure trends of types of conductors and environmental factors, that may increase asset health deterioration. The 2021 Overhead Primary Deteriorated Conductor Replacement Program targeted areas with the greatest public safety consequence, high priority replacement attributes, and areas experiencing repeat Wires Down events.

b) Electric Emergency Response Time—Corrective Action: In January 2021, major wind events significantly impacted 911 emergency response performance. To improve performance, proactive measures were taken to understand the main drivers contributing to higher response times, long drive times and lack of available resources. Leveraging this cause analysis,

over 200 non-traditional response staff (from Information Technology and Generation lines of business) were trained to become available stand-by resources during extreme weather. In addition, further analysis was conducted to identify resources that live in remote areas and they were also trained to respond to emergency stand-by requests. Having these additional personnel trained and ready to respond during weather events will put PG&E in a better position to respond to emergency calls in a timely manner.

c) Fire Ignitions: Informs Risk-Based Decision Making: PG&E started cataloging reportable ignition data in June 2014 per our Fire Incident Data Collection Plan (Risk-6306S) and has used the data to gauge performance and drive data-driven wildfire risk reduction strategies.

PG&E observed a significant reduction in ignitions in HFTD during late Q3 and through the entirety of Q4 2021, primarily influenced by Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) enablement in late July 2021. PG&E can expect to see improved performance on this metric through continual execution of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan and maturation of key wildfire mitigation strategies, including:

- Enablement and expansion of the EPSS program;
- Public Safety Power Shutoff; and
- System hardening inclusive of undergrounding.

d) Employee Days Away, Restricted and Transfer (DART): Corrective Action and Informs Risk-Based Decision Making: PG&E has developed mitigations and uses controls to address employee safety, which was informed by the Employee, Lost Work Day (LWD), and Employee DART Rate metrics. These controls and mitigations include:

- Injury Management:
  - On-site Clinics: Expanding services in on-site clinics to provide PG&E coworkers with convenient access to both occupational and non-occupational health care services which can lead to a healthier workforce by reducing the duration of DART cases, including LWD cases.
  - Telephonic Case Management (TCM) program: PG&E's TCM program provides early case management intervention through the assignment of a TCM nurse on all new Workers' Compensation

(WC) claims requiring a clinic visit. Program goals include reduction in claim costs and injury severity (DART and LWD cases), and aid in better recovery outcomes.

  - Nurse Care Line (NCL): The NCL provides 24/7 support and access to trained medical professionals for PG&E coworkers experiencing work-related discomfort or injury. Enhancements to the injury reporting process that will streamline the process and improve the coworker experience include the implementation of a new app and a closed-caption option for the hearing impaired.
  - Injury containment: Partner with the lines of business and provide enhanced injury management to ensure appropriate containment strategies are being utilized on occupational injuries at risk for escalation to DART.

- Ergonomic programs:
  - The Industrial Athlete (IA) program efforts include targeted interactions with an IA specialist with an emphasis on high-risk areas identified by data analysis, and biomechanical observations. Program enhancements include increased staffing of IA specialists and Occupational Health Physicians, a more streamlined approach for injury management, and new wearable technology. The expansion further supports a reduction in DART, including LWD cases.
  - Office ergonomic specialists use data to proactively work with coworkers prior to them experiencing discomfort and identify and provide targeted interventions for those with a high-risk of injury through predictive modeling. Program efforts are intended to prevent or reduce serious ergonomic symptoms and injury (DART and LWD cases).
  - The Industrial ergonomics program goals are to reduce the risk of injury through engineering, administrative and behavior controls. Program uses a risk-based approach to identify the most physically demanding tasks, perform a task analysis, and then develop a proactive approach for solutioning improvements for risk reduction.

- The Vehicle ergonomics program is designed to educate coworkers on good ergonomics while driving and address preventative and discomfort resolution measures. Program enhancements include the automation of assessment forms and focusing on the highest risk work groups for vehicle ergonomic injuries.

e) Employee Serious Injury and Fatality (SIF): Corrective Actions follow-up: Power Generation conducted a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to identify failure mode criticality and priority and develop hazard risk ranking methodology and criteria to establish allowable use (type of vehicle) for each road hazard type. As follow-up in 2021, a Hydro Generation Road Safety Program standard was developed and published to the PG&E guidance library for use by all Power Generation employees in conjunction with the Hydro Generation Road Inspections and Hydro Generation Road Classifications procedures. The documents provide requirements to consistently risk rank road and road segments for minimizing hazards prior to their use. In addition, Power Generation also developed a Hydro Generation Road Safety Program - Critical Vehicle Considerations Checklist for determining vehicle restrictions and mitigating actions required for roads that are not yet classified.

f) Employee SIF, Public SIF – Motor Vehicle Safety Risk Informed Decision Making: In 2021, PG&E conducted a three-month pilot on cell phone blocking technology, an engineering control to block phone activity and use while driving to reduce the potential for distracted driving. The risk factors analysis study conducted by the UCLA B. John Garrick Institute for the Risk Sciences as part of the RAMP analysis indicate distraction as the highest percentage contributing factor based on available PG&E MVI data. Eliminating distracted driving can result in a reduction in employee motor vehicle incidents, including those that result in serious injuries and fatalities to employees and the public. The goal of the pilot was to test the technology, compatibility and determine if it is a potentially viable solution for the Company. In the Pilot there were two groups, the Audit Group, who had full access to their phone, and the Protected Group, who had access only to specific emergency numbers and application programs (apps) on their

phone. This technology does not block access to company decided emergency cell phone features.

Results from the pilot:

- Without cell phone blocking technology in place, the Audit Group had:
  - One distraction every 6 miles; and
  - 260 hours of talk time.
- With cell phone blocking technology in place, the Protected group was allowed access to fourteen company approved emergency phone numbers and nine work apps. The Protected Group had:
  - One distraction every 36 miles; and
  - 17 hours of hands-free talk time.

Results indicate the Audit group had 14.5 times more talk time, 3.5 times more app usage, and 7 times more "rings, dings, or touches" on their device while driving than the Protected Group. Based on the pilot results and opportunities for improvement, PG&E will continue to assess this technology with a targeted group of 1,000 users over a 2-year period.

g) Gas Dig-in, Shut In The Gas Average Time – Services, Cross Bore Intrusions, and Gas Emergency Response: Informs Risk-Based Decision Making: In 2021, Gas Operations continued the journey of Process Safety Management maturity. The Process Safety Indicator (PSI) dashboard, based on a pyramid framework, is reviewed monthly at Operational Review Meetings and other senior leadership platforms. This includes review of relevant metrics, including Safety Performance Metrics such gas dig-ins, shut in the gas average time, cross bore intrusions, and gas emergency response. Gas Operations continued to be compliant, per a third-party assessment, with the intent of API RP754, Process Safety Performance Indicators, demonstrating a commitment to incident prevention.

The metrics alignment framework helps to drive ownership and accountability to ensure leading indicators are acted upon to prevent a major gas incident that can lead to serious injuries, fatalities, or cause significant interruption to the gas business. These metrics continue to be evaluated during the Daily Operating Reviews (or huddles) beyond those calibrated at the beginning of the year to ensure that Gas Operations drives the

appropriate continuous improvement conversations. The DORs include a Lean visual management dashboard.

The dashboard was expanded to be presented at the Quality and Process Improvement Committee and Process Safety Moments are a standing agenda item within Gas Operations' monthly Risk and Compliance Committee meetings. Updates to metric alignment to the correct mega process also took place, ensuring ownership and accountability.

h) Third Party Dig-Ins: Corrective Action and Informs Risk-Based Decision Making – New Web-Based Trainings (WBT) (Safety Awareness For Excavator (SAFE)-0811 and SAFE-0812) created in cooperation with the academy for improving internal safe excavation practices and limiting unintentional impacts on locating resources through inefficient or improper USA tickets (i.e., over delineation, unnecessary re-marks, etc.).

- Driven by dig-in ratios and American Gas Association quartile performance for 1st and 2nd Party dig-ins.

Risk Mitigation – 3rd Party Dig-in data supported the development of the GPS devices in development by the Research and Development team. The GPS devices are affixed to pieces of excavation equipment and have geo-fence alerts on them to notify the equipment operator that they are approaching a PG&E Gas Transmission facility. They are also trackable on a master system and they have telemetry sensors that detect movements of the equipment consistent with excavation activity. Based on location and excavation activity, use of the equipment in an area without a USA ticket could/would initiate contact with the excavation company to generate communication and remedy any identified unsafe excavation. This technology was included in the 2020 RAMP as Alternative Plan 2: Mitigate Transmission Pipeline Third Party Damage 1 Events.

In 2021, continuation of new WBT and ongoing utilization of the GPS devices in PG&E's excavation equipment were just some efforts that contributed towards:

- Locator At Faults were down 17 percent compared to 2020;
- Total Dig-ins were down 4 percent compared to 2020;
- 1st Party Dig-ins were down 21 percent compared to 2020;
- 3rd Party Dig-ins were down 5 percent compared to 2020; and

- PG&E achieved 1st Decile for total dig-in, ending the year with a ratio of 0.98.

Of those assigned to SAFE-0811 and SAFE-0812, 92 percent have completed this training. The remaining 8 percent will be completed in 2022.

Additional changes implemented in 2021:

- Locate & Mark Field Training Program provided updated training to all Locators and helped drive down Locator At Faults;
- Working with Contractor Safety to reduce 2nd Party Dig-ins through After Action Review and Education; and
- Break through Ideas to reduce No USA ideation session.

i) Gas Over Pressure Events – Risk-Informed Decision Making – PG&E has identified human performance and equipment failure as the two most common causes for Overpressure events. As result of benchmarking with other utilities and in alignment with our internal strategic objectives, PG&E presented our industry leading Over Pressure Protection (OPP) Enhancement Program in both the 2019 Gas Transmission and Storage Rate Case and 2020 General Rate Case testimony. In 2021, the Slam Shut installation program (a method of secondary OPP) ramped up momentum while installing 281 Gas Distribution system slam shuts and 18 Gas Transmission system slam shuts. Sixteen Slam Shut activations that prevented larger over pressure events have occurred since late December 2020.

j) Gas Over Pressure Events – Improving Staff Training – PG&E has identified human performance and equipment failure as the two most common causes for Overpressure events. In 2021, PG&E implemented the HU (Human Performance) Tools and Capability Training series that consisted of capability building activities with the goal to reduce over pressure linked to HU causes. 100 percent of Supervisors and Grassroots leads were trained.

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SECTION 3

BIAS CONTROLS AND METHODOLOGY

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2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

III. Bias Controls and Methodology

PG&E utilizes multiple bias controls and systems to ensure reporting of the metric data cannot be manipulated or skewed. PG&E incorporates internal and external auditing, third-party data collection and resources, and state mandated reporting to safety regulators such as the OSHA. PG&E utilizes automated processes such as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system to actively monitor potential issues in our gas equipment. PG&E uses database systems such as the Energy Management tool and SAP for accurate data input and automatically generates a change log for every notification down to the field-by-field basis to ensure system controls and retention of record history. Additionally, only specific personnel or teams can enter or edit data such as the Centralized Inspection Review Team. The data is reviewed by the process team to ensure accuracy. Many of the metrics included in this report are reviewed by Business, Process, and Governance teams and leadership at meetings to discuss performance and take action.

PG&E's Internal Audit and Law Department also regularly review many of the metrics identified in this report.

For a description of the bias controls applicable to each metric, see the bias control section within the metric discussion.

<u>Individual or Group Performance Tied to Metrics</u>

PG&E sets goals annually for employees in our goals system iConnect, that cascade throughout each line of business (LOB). For a given year:

1) Senior Leaders identify the most significant areas of focus;
2) Senior Leaders set high level goals (e.g., Short-Term Incentive Plan metrics) and provide direction on other areas of focus;
3) Goal setting is disaggregated and managed within the LOBs;
4) Downstream leaders set operational goals to meet objectives; and
5) Goal setting is managed locally.

For this report, to determine if a metric is tied to a specific goal PG&E reviewed all available 2021 goals and metrics for Officers and Directors for the Enterprise. PG&E met this requirement by searching all LOB goals for

each SPMR metric name and identified the officers and Directors with performance goals that are tied to each SPMR metric.

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SECTION 4

2021 IMPUTED ADOPTED VALUES FOR SAFETY-RELATED RISK MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

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2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

IV. 2021 Imputed Adopted Values for Safety-Related Risk Mitigation Activities

The total estimated risk mitigation spending level as adopted in the 2020 General Rate Case for 2021 and the recorded spend is provided in Table 4-1 below.

TABLE 4-1
2021 TOTAL SAFETY-RELATED RISK MITIGATION IMPUTED ADOPTED VALUES AND RECORDED COSTS

Line No.		Expense	Capital
1	2021 Imputed Regulatory Values	$1,834,867.05	$3,457,126.98
2	2021 Recorded	$3,297,352.01	$4,208,541.55

Note: This table is comprised of all Major Work Categories or Maintenance Activity Types that are related to safety-related risk mitigation activities.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

SECTION 5 – SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS

Metric 1: T&D Overhead Wires Down Non-Major Event Days

Metric Name and Description: T&D Overhead Wires Down Non-Major Event Days – Number of instances where an electric transmission or primary distribution conductor is broken, or remains intact, and falls from its intended position to rest on the ground or a foreign object; a conductor is considered energized unless confirmed in an idle state (i.e., de-energized); excludes down secondary distribution wires and "Major Event Days" (MED) (typically due to severe storm events) as defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366.

Risks: Wildfire, Transmission Overhead Conductor, and DOCP[1]

Category: Electric

Units: Number of wire down events

Summary:

FIGURE 5-1
T&D OVERHEAD WIRES DOWN METRIC DATA EXCLUDING MEDS (ANNUAL)



[1] The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: (1) Wildfire, (2) Failure of Electric Transmission Overhead Assets; and (3) Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Assets. Transmission Overhead Conductor and Distribution Overhead Conductor – Primary (DOCP) no longer exist as separate risks.

Narrative Context: In 2012, PG&E initiated the Wires Down Program (including introduction of the wires down metric) to address the Company's increased focus on public safety by reducing the number of conductors that fail and result in a contact with the ground, a vehicle, or other object. Before 2012, wires down data was collected in the OUTAGE and ESLIC databases but not tracked or used as a metric. As part of the Wires Down Program, in an effort to identify and mitigate the root cause of wires down incidents, Electric Operations implemented a program to visit wires down locations to gather essential data, understand the cause, and develop work plans to mitigate future wires down incidents.

Significant work has been performed to reduce wires down, including replacing overhead conductors, vegetation clearing, hardening of distribution circuits, infrared inspections of overhead lines to identify and repair hot spots, and investigating wire down incidents and implementing learnings/corrective actions.

PG&E's Vegetation Management team conducts site visits of vegetation-caused wires-down events as part of its standard tree-caused service interruption investigation process. The data obtained from site visits supports efforts to reduce future vegetation-caused wires-down events. The data collected from these investigations also helps identify failure patterns by tree species that are associated with wires-down events.

2021 experienced 2,741 wire down events compared to 2,494 in 2020, roughly a 10 percent increase. However, performance is in line with the 10-year historical average of 2,802. Improvements have been made to the wires down forecast model to include weather day and non–weather day information to better understand events not related to weather. This provided better insights to blue sky day conductor performance and improved forecasting performance.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, in 2021, T&D Overhead Wires Down Non-Major Event Days is a STIP metric as part of Wire-Down Events Due to Equipment Failure.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the T&D Overhead Wires Down metric is linked to 2021 performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the T&D Overhead Wires Down metric is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: The T&D Wires Down metric is a strong proxy of the overall goal of reducing the potential contacts with wires down and improving the reliability of the electric system along with reducing public safety risk. From the metric data, performance, and target-setting perspective, there are several controls put in place that have been verified by Internal Audit.

- The wires down events are reported by field and control center personnel per uniform reporting guidelines as the events occur.
- Engineers conduct post wire down event reviews (typically for the non-MED events) and will initiate corrections to the data via the outage quality team to ensure the reporting guidelines were followed and the records align with information reported by repair crews.
- The outage quality team processes all valid change requests received and also initiates corrections based on their reviews and findings of the collected outage information.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: The T&D Wires Down metric (excluding downed secondary distribution wires and MEDs) is not a 2020 GRC or RAMP stated safety goal. This metric has been one of the key indicators that PG&E is using to track Public Safety Performance.

Significant work was performed to reduce wires down, including replacing overhead conductor, vegetation clearing, hardening of distribution circuits, infrared inspections of overhead lines to identify and repair hot spots, investigating wires down incidents, and implementing learnings/corrective actions.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 2: Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Overhead Wires Down – Major Event Days (MED)

Metric Name and Description: T&D Overhead Wires Down – MEDs – Number of instances where an electric transmission or primary distribution conductor is broken, or remains intact, and falls from its intended position to rest on the ground or a foreign object; a conductor is considered energized unless confirmed in an idle state (i.e. de-energized).Includes MEDs (typically due to severe storm events) as defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366.

Risks: Wildfire, Transmission Overhead Conductor, DOCP[2]

Category: Electric

Units: Number of wire down events

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2 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: (1) Wildfire; (2) Failure of Electric Transmission Overhead Assets; and (3) Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Assets. Transmission Overhead Conductor and Distribution Overhead Conductor – Primary no longer exist as separate risks.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-2
T&D OVERHEAD WIRES DOWN METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Historical Number of MEDs

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
4	4	5	10	3	30	7	31	14	25

Narrative Context: The metric, inclusive of MEDs is not being used for internal reporting purposes. PG&E focuses on transmission and primary distribution conductor wire down events, excluding MEDs. As can be seen in the data above, particularly in 2017, 2019, and 2021 the results for this metric fluctuate heavily based on the number of severe weather event days in a particular year. PG&E uses the IEEE 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and apply excludable MEDs to measure the performance of its electric system under normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the past five years. The SAIDI index is used as the basis

since it leads to consistent results and is a good indicator of operational and design stress. The 2021 performance was roughly 77 percent worse than that of 2020, primarily due to January wind events and historic snowstorms that occurred in December. Given the fluctuations driven in this metric from weather patterns, PG&E does not view it as an appropriate metric to properly assess system performance or improvement.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the T&D Overhead Wires Down–MEDs metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the T&D Overhead Wires Down–MEDs metric is not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the T&D Overhead Wires Down–MEDs metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: While PG&E does not focus on this metric with MEDs included, the following is in place for the traditional measure (with MEDs excluded):
The T&D Wires Down metric is a strong proxy of the overall goal of reducing the potential contacts with wires down and improving the reliability of the electric system along with reducing public safety risk. From the metric data, performance, and target-setting perspective, there are several controls put in place that have been verified by Internal Audit.

– The wires down events are reported by field and control center personnel per uniform reporting guidelines as the events occur.
– Engineers conduct post wire down event reviews (typically for the non-MED events) and will initiate corrections to the data via the outage quality team to ensure the reporting guidelines were followed and the records align with information reported by repair crews.

– The outage quality team processes all valid change requests received and initiates corrections based on their reviews and findings of the collected outage information.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metrics is not a safety goal in the 2020 GRC. PG&E does not focus on this metric inclusive of MEDs; therefore, it is not used to track safety performance. The T&D Wires Down metric excluding MEDs is used to track Public Safety Performance. See Metric 1 discussion for additional detail.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 3: Electric Emergency Response Time

Metric Name and Description: Electric Emergency Response Time – Average time and median time in minutes to respond on-site to an electric related emergency notification from the time of notification to the time a representative (or qualified first responder) arrived onsite. Emergency notification includes all notifications originating from 911 calls and calls made directly to the utilities' safety hotlines. The data used to determine the average time and median time shall be provided in increments as defined in (GO) 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

Risks: Wildfire, Overhead Conductor, Public Safety, Worker Safety[3]

Category: Electric

Units: The time in minutes that an electric crew person or a qualified first responder takes to respond after receiving a call which results in an emergency order.

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3 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: (1) Wildfire, (2) Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Assets, (3) Third-Party Safety Incident (4) Employee Safety Incident; and (5) Contractor Safety Incident. Distribution Overhead Conductor – Primary no longer exists as a separate risk.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-3
ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME (AVERAGE AND MEDIAN)
(ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E's response to 911 calls and the amount of time it takes field resources to respond to those calls is primary performance metric used to evaluate PG&E's commitment to public safety. There is a direct linkage between public safety and a utility's response to emergency situations, which is why PG&E selected emergency response time for this element of the performance metric.

The keys to performing well on this metric are accurately predicting when large volumes of calls will come in (based on weather forecasts) and ensuring there are enough resources on hand to respond to all calls. This requires coordinating across departments (like Electric and Gas Operations) to share resources to respond when high volumes of 911 calls are anticipated. These tactics are especially important during stormy weather; high call volume during bad weather days may vary from year-to-year.

Metric performance has been driven by proactive scheduling of resources for 911 response, coordination across multiple LOBs on training and availability of resources for weather days and improved understanding of shifts in storm

fronts and impacts on the system. Additional actions include faster resource notification, utilization of GPS to integrate vehicle and the 911 standby tag locations and use of supplemental (non-traditional) resources.

PG&E's response to 911 electric-related emergencies improved by roughly 50 percent from 2011-2020. In 2021, both PGE's average and median response time increased nearly a minute, respectively (driven by weather events experienced in January and December), from 2020 performance but was ~50 percent better than the Company goal (and tracked metric) of responding on-site to an Electric emergency within 60 minutes. First quartile response times were also maintained

PG&E began benchmarking its response to 911 calls with other utilities in 2012. PG&E's 2011 performance was 3rd quartile, improving to 2nd quartile in 2012-2014, and reaching 1st quartile in 2015. Since 2015, PG&E's historical performance has been within the first quartile and best-in-class in some years.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Electric Emergency Response (within 60 minutes) is a 2021 STIP goal.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Electric Emergency Response (within 60 minutes) metric is linked to 2021 performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Electric Emergency Response (within 60 minutes) metric is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: Several controls, verified by Internal Audit, are in place for this metric. The metric performance data is captured and stored in the Outage Information System (OIS) database. Each 911 call has a time stamp. The start time of a 911 call involves receipt by utility personnel and entry into the OIS database (creation of a tag). The tag is created in the OIS database when the PG&E personnel is on the phone with the 911 dispatch agency (there is a direct

911 stand-by line into Gas dispatch, where all 911 stand-by calls are routed). This process removes the delay between the time the call is received and entered into the system.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 GRC safety goal.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 4: Fire Ignitions

Metric Name and Description: Fire Ignitions – The number of fire incidents annually reportable to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) per Decision (D.) 14-02-015.

Risks: Overhead Conductor, Wildfire, Public Safety, Worker Safety, Catastrophic Event Preparedness[4]

Category: Electric

Units: Number of reportable ignitions.

Summary:

[4] The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: (1) Wildfire, (2) Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Assets, (3) Third-Party Safety Incident, (4) Employee Safety Incident, (5) Contractor Safety Incident, and (6) Emergency Preparedness and Response. Distribution Overhead Conductor – Primary no longer exists as a separate risk.

FIGURE 5-4A
FIRE IGNITION METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)[5,6,7]



5 The 2015-2019 fire ignition metric data reflects fire ignitions previously not included in the 2019 Safety Performance Metrics Report due to a misidentification in a field-based documentation system. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) has concluded an audit of field-based systems that could have contained these misidentified ignition records and these records are reflected in the totals above.

6 This report reflects 4 ignitions in 2021 that meet Electric Incident Report criteria, defined by Appendix B to CPUC D.06-04-055, for which PG&E has not formed a conclusion about the origin or cause.

7 PG&E has included the Zogg Fire in this ignition count because California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection has announced that the cause of the Zogg Fire was a pine tree contacting PG&E overhead electric lines. PG&E's investigation into the cause of the Zogg Fire is ongoing.

TABLE 5-4B
FIRE IGNITIONS METRIC DATA BY LOCATION (ANNUAL)

Year	Non-HFTD	Tier 2	Tier 3	Zone 1	Total
2014	270	8	1		279
2015	336	96	40	2	474
2016	272	90	37		399
2017	389	137	63	1	595
2018	280	114	73		467
2019	367	95	24		486
2020	360	117	39		516
2021	345	93	39	1	478

Narrative Context: Reportable Fire Ignitions is a primary metric used to evaluate PG&E's commitment to public safety. This metric tracks the number of electrically involved fire ignitions with the conditions that meet the CPUC definition in D.14-02-015 within PG&E's service territory. PG&E began tracking this data in July 2014. The data is collected from multiple sources and validated through our Fire Incident Data Collection Process (RISK-6306S/P):

- The Field Applications System provides ignition information from Distribution Troublemen as they respond to Field Orders. When a Troubleman arrives at an incident location and identifies signs that an ignition occurred, the Troubleman selects "Yes" in the "Fire Incident" field of their data entry device. This then opens an "Ignitions" tab where the Troubleman enters information related to the ignition, including the fire location, suppressing agency information, whether media is on site, if the fire was extinguished, equipment ID numbers, weather, facility impacted, estimated wind, event element, fire size, type of construction, and evidence collected. The Troubleman has an option to attach pictures and other documents to the Field Order. This information is received by the Wildfire Risk Management team who quality check (QC) and further investigate the ignitions.
- The Transmission Outage Tracking and Logging system provides information about any planned or unplanned outages on Transmission and Substation assets. This system indicates if an ignition resulted from an unplanned transmission system outage or interruption. The information is logged by the Grid Control Operators. The interruptions resulting in an ignition are sent to EII who reviews and further investigate the ignitions.

- The Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS)/Outage Information System (OIS) systems contain information related to outages and switching to restore customers that were de-energized due to an equipment failure or electric incident. This information applies only to ignitions that result in an outage and contains information about the fault, potential causes of the fault, location and circuit information, customers affected by the outage, and steps and times to restore power to affected customers.
- The information received from these systems goes through a thorough investigation process. This process ensures that all required information for an event is received shortly after the event has occurred, and also ensures the ignition data is complete and accurate. The information is received by the EII team and entered into the Fire Ignition Tracker. The EII team then verifies the fire location, High Fire Threat District (HFTD), event element, suspected initiating cause and other fields. The Wildfire Risk Management team also communicates with Troublemen and responding fire agency incident leads and creating executive summaries to communicate findings.
- Discrepancies identified in our system of records (ILIS/OIS/FAS/Transmission Operation Tracking and Logging) are corrected during this investigation phase.
- The data is also sent to the appropriate Asset Family Owners to help those teams identify and address failure trends and align mitigation strategies with areas of risk. This data is also utilized to inform the wildfire risk model.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Fire Ignitions metric is a component of the Wildfire Risk Reduction which was used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) metric for 2021. Wildfire Risk Reduction measured all CPUC Reportable Ignitions attributed to PG&E equipment that burned greater than 100 acres.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Fire Ignitions metric is linked to 2021 group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Fire Ignitions metric is linked to all individual goals as part of 2022 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: The EII team has an ignition review process to ensure that all required information for an event is received shortly after the event occurred, is complete, and is accurate. The EII Metrics team updates the Fire Ignitions Tracker by doing the following:

- Inputs data from the various data sources into tracker;
- Performs initial QC to verify the fire Lat/Long, HFTD, Event Element, and Suspected Initiating Cause;
- Once the information is added to the tracker and the initial review is compete, the EII team performs an in-depth QC and an investigation when necessary by doing the following:
  - Reviews information received from data sources for accuracy;
  - Confirms or revises the initial assessment made at intake; and
  - Interviews the Troublemen and/or responding fire agencies as necessary.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: While this metric was not a stated safety goal in the 2020 General Rate Case (GRC), PG&E tracks the number of fires (ignitions) as one of its key performance measures. PG&E's 2020 GRC testimony[8] discussed planned work to mitigate the risk of wildfires, and indicated that the controls for this risk will continue to be strengthened in the future due to the increasing severity of drought conditions, the size of PG&E's electric system, and the quantity and diversity of trees in the Company's service territory.

Monthly Data: See attachment A at the end of this report.

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8 See 2020 GRC Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 2A (Wildfire Risk and Policy Overview) for a complete description of PG&E's wildfire controls and mitigations.

Metric 5: Gas Dig-In

Metric Name and Description: Gas Dig-In – The number of third-party gas dig-ins per 1,000 Underground Service Alert (USA) tags/tickets received for gas. The ticket count excludes fiber and electric tickets. A gas dig-in refers to any impact or exposure that results in the need to repair an underground facility due to a weakening or the partial or complete destruction of the facility, including, but not limited to, the protective coating, lateral support, cathodic protection or the housing for the line device or facility. A third-party dig-in is damage caused by someone other than the utility or a utility contractor.

The Company participates in a one-call "811" public service program administered by USA. USA provides the Company notification of activities that could be damaging to the Company's gas pipelines. These notifications are referred to as USA tickets. A ticket is the receipt of information by the Company from USA regarding onsite meetings, project designs, or a planned excavation. The ticket component of this metric includes PG&E gas tickets received from all parties (i.e., first-, second-, and third-parties).

Risks: Transmission Pipeline Failure – Rupture with Ignition and Distribution Pipeline Rupture with Ignition (non-Cross Bore), Catastrophic Damage involving Gas Infrastructure (Dig-Ins)[9]

Category: Gas

Units: The number of third-party gas dig-ins per 1,000 USA tags/tickets.

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9 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of Containment on Gas Transmission Pipeline and Loss of Containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-5
THIRD-PARTY DIG-INS PER 1,000 TICKETS (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: There has been a downward trend in the number of third-party dig-ins per 1,000 USA tickets since 2014, with a slight uptick in 2020. At the same time, the number of USA tickets has increased. From 2014-2021, PG&E experienced a 149 percent increase in USA tickets. With the increase in USA tickets received between 2014-2017 the third-party dig-in count climbed, peaking in 2017, with 1,780 third-party dig-ins and then began a steady decline to 1,531 third-party dig-ins in 2021. PG&E attributes the reduction in the number of third-party dig-ins per 1,000 USA tickets to PG&E's increase in Damage Prevention activities.

To continuously focus on improving performance, metric results are reported monthly and reviewed at leadership meetings and weekly huddles to discuss results and actions to take, as needed.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Gas Dig-In metric was used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas Dig-In metric is linked to 2021 group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Gas Dig-In metric is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: All dig-ins are reviewed by the Damage Prevention team to determine appropriate delineation of first-party, second-party or third-party dig-in. Total USA tickets are determined by the California one-call system, independent to PG&E.

The metric definition for this metric including targets, target setting methodology, and exclusions, is documented and approved by Gas Operations Leadership. Metric results are reported monthly by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team and reviewed at leadership meetings to discuss performance and take action as needed. In the event there is a resulting need for additional budget or other resources, approval must be obtained from the Gas Operations Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

On a quarterly basis, a supporting documentation package is prepared by the Damage Prevention team, reviewed by the Business Process Governance team, and then routed for Gas Operations Senior Leadership approval. The support packages are also reviewed quarterly by Compensation and Internal Audit.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric supports and reflects progress in PG&E's safety goal of dig-in prevention for the safety of both PG&E contractors and the public at large by reduced dig-ins per 1,000 tickets.[10] Specific Damage Prevention and Public Safety initiatives that contribute to dig-in reduction included in the 2020 GRC were: (1) continued participation in the

[10] See 2020 GRC (1) Exhibit (PG&E-14), Chapter 12, pp. 14-26 through 14-30; and (2) Exhibit (PG&E-3), Chapter 6, pp. 6-13 through 6-14.

Gold Shovel Program including providing certification to the contracting community on dig-in prevention, (2) the use of caution tape in PG&E's construction activities, which provides excavators with a clear sign that gas facilities are present, (3) additional training for PG&E excavators to conduct a "pre-sweep" prior to excavation, ensuring that all structures are identified, (4) a Damage Prevention Manual to provide clear instruction around critical processes, including troubleshooting of difficult to locate facilities, and (5) the Public Awareness program which aims to improve public awareness by sending bill inserts in the mail, making education links available on e-mail bill pay, sending separate mailers, running ads in newspapers and the radio, and conducting companywide campaigns for Call 811 Before You Dig.

PG&E's transmission-related Locate and Mark activities are discussed in the 2019 Gas Transmission and Storage (GT&S) Rate Case.[11] Additionally, PG&E describes its goal to maintain a "Line of Sight" for all pipeline markers in the 2019 GT&S Rate Case.[12] Pipeline markers are effective for preventing dig-ins or accidental damage of PG&E assets.

PG&E's Locate and Mark program is identified as a control to the Loss of Containment on Gas Transmission Pipeline[13] as well as Loss of Containment on Gas Distribution Main and Service[14] risk in the 2021 RAMP.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

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11 See 2019 GT&S Rate Case Prepared Testimony, Volume 1, Chapter 9, pp. 9-12 through 9-15.

12 See 2019 GT&S Rate Case Prepared Testimony, Volume 1, Chapter 9, p. 9-29.

13 See 2020 RAMP, p. 7-20.

14 See 2020 RAMP, pp. 8-25 through 8-25.

Metric 6: Gas In-Line Inspection (ILI)

Metric Name and Description: Gas ILI – Total miles of transmission pipe inspected annually by ILI and percentage of transmission pipelines inspected annually by inline inspections.

Risks: Catastrophic Damage Involving High-Pressure Pipeline Failure[15]

Category: Gas

Units: Total number of miles of inspections performed and percentage inspected by ILI annually.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-6
MILES OF PIPELINE INSPECTED (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context:

This metric measures Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) ILI work completed, including activities that exceed current code requirements. After the pipeline is upgraded to accommodate an ILI tool, cleaning and inspections are conducted to collect data about the pipe. This data is analyzed for pipeline anomalies that must be remediated through the Direct Examination and Repair process where the anomaly is exposed, examined and repaired as necessary.

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15 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risk: Loss of Containment on Gas Transmission Pipeline.

The information from Direct Examination and Repair is used to generate additional prevention/mitigation activities to improve the long-term safety and reliability of the pipeline.

Total miles of pipeline in-line inspected with traditional ILI tools vary by year and are correlated with miles of pipeline upgraded and required re-inspection miles. Decision 11-06-017, as codified by Public Utilities Code Section 958, requires natural gas transmission pipelines in California to be capable of ILIs, where warranted. In addition, both Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations – Transportation Part 192, Subpart O, and PG&E's traditional ILI Program procedures requires reassessments, which drive the required ILI re-inspection miles in a given year. Further, ILI is the most reliable pipeline integrity assessment tool currently available to natural gas pipeline operators to assess the internal and external condition of transmission line pipe. In 2021, PG&E inspected a total of 970.5 miles of pipe that accounts for 15 percent of transmission lines inspected. From 2012-2021, the total number of miles of inspections performed increased by 452.6 percent. The increase in total number of transmission miles inspected in 2021 compared to the prior years is based on the compliance work that has been identified and the compliance cycle by which PG&E needs to assess it by.

To continuously focus on improving performance, metric results are reported monthly and reviewed at leadership meetings and weekly huddles to discuss results and take action as needed. Performance in 2021 was on target. As noted above, the number of miles in-line inspected vary by year and are correlated with miles of pipeline upgraded and required re-inspection miles.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Gas ILI metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas ILI metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Gas ILI metric.

- **Senior Director:** Gas Operations (GO) (1); and
- **Senior Vice President:** GO (1).

Bias Controls: Metric results are reported monthly by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team and reviewed at leadership meetings to discuss performance and take action. In the event that there is a resulting need for additional budget or resources, approval must be obtained from the Gas Operations Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

During the years that this was a STIP metric, on a quarterly basis the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team worked to confirm ILI projects and mileage with various stakeholders. Mileage and unit capture dates from the P6 database (scheduling program used by the GT Project Management team) were verified by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team to ensure consistency with the Assessment Completion Notification (ACN) form (Engineering record), which is signed by the ILI engineering Supervisor or Manager. A supporting documentation package for metric results was prepared quarterly by the Business Process Governance team, then routed for Gas Operations Senior Leadership approval. The support packages were also reviewed each quarter by Compensation and Internal Audit.

In 2021, the metric was no longer included as a STIP metric, however the review process established by the Business Process Governance team was maintained.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 General Rate Case safety goal given this metric is a gas transmission, not distribution, related metric. In 2021 and 2022, PG&E forecasts Traditional ILI Upgrades for an additional 881 miles, bringing the total piggable mileage to approximately 3,697 miles (~56 percent of the system) by the end of 2022. PG&E's ILI Program is intended to bring the total first time ILI miles to approximately 3,109 miles by the end of 2021 (~47 percent of the system), in

addition to performing re-inspections on approximately 1,000 miles over the 2019-2021 period.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 7: Gas In-Line Upgrade

Metric Name and Description: Gas In-Line Upgrade – Miles of gas transmission lines upgraded annually to permit inline inspections.

Risks: Catastrophic Damage Involving High-Pressure Pipeline Failure[16]

Category: Gas

Units: Miles

Summary:

FIGURE 5-7
MILES OF PIPELINE UPGRADED (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: This metric measures the number of miles of complete planned Traditional In-Line Inspection (ILI) Upgrade projects, including activities that exceed current code requirements. Prior to running a Traditional ILI tool in a pipeline, a pipeline must be modified with portals called "launchers" and "receivers," and pipeline features that would obstruct the passage of the tool to make the pipeline piggable must be replaced.

Annual Traditional ILI upgrade mileage totals have increased in the last few years. D.11-06-017, as codified by Pub. Util. Section 958, requires natural gas

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16 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of Containment on Gas Transmission Pipeline.

transmission pipelines in California be capable of ILIs, where warranted. ILI is the most reliable pipeline integrity assessment tool currently available to natural gas pipeline operators to assess the internal and external condition of transmission line pipe. In 2020, PG&E upgraded 464.2 miles of pipe which is a 352 percent increase compared to 102.7 miles inspected in 2012. However, there has been a downtick in 2021 with 145.6 miles of pipe being upgraded by PG&E due to having only one upgrade segment spanning greater than 40 miles.

There are three major phases to an ILI Program. This metric is to track progress on the first phase, which involves modifying or upgrading the existing pipeline system to accommodate a traditional ILI tool. PG&E refers to this as "Traditional ILI Upgrades," which involve capital improvements to make the pipelines piggable. It includes installing pig launchers and receivers in appropriate locations to introduce and remove the cleaning and ILI tools from the inside of the pipeline. It also includes replacing certain segments of pipe, valves, fittings or other appurtenances that, if left in the system, would obstruct the movement of the tool through the pipeline.[17]

While the metric for this program is "miles upgraded," the miles targeted for a given year may vary greatly. The amount of work associated with Traditional ILI Upgrades is based on projects and is not directly related to miles. This is the reason that PG&E's 2019 GT&S Rate Case forecast for the Traditional ILI Upgrade Program was based on a cost per project basis and did not use the length of projects as a forecasting basis.

To continuously focus on improving performance, metric results are reported monthly and reviewed at leadership meetings and weekly huddles to discuss results and act as needed. Projects completed in 2021 are on pace with rate case targets and the Company's plans to upgrade its transmission pipeline to accommodate Traditional ILI tools on approximately 69 percent of its transmission pipeline system by the end of 2036.

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[17] For instance, it involves replacing reduced port valves and other obstructions, such as drip tubes, miter bends, short-radius elbows, and unbarred tees from the pipeline.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Gas In-line Upgrade metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas In-Line Upgrade metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021 the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Gas In-Line Upgrade metric:

- **Senior Director:** Gas Operations (GO) (1); and
- **Senior Vice President:** GO (1).

Bias Controls: Monitoring controls exist for this metric. Metric results are reported monthly by the GO Business Process Governance team and reviewed at leadership meetings and huddles to discuss performance and take action. In the event there is a resulting need for additional dollars or resources, approval must be obtained from the GO Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

During the years that this metric was a STIP metric (2014-2018), on a quarterly basis the GO Business Process Governance team worked to confirm ILI projects and mileage with various stakeholders. Mileage and unit capture dates from the P6 scheduling database were verified by the GO Business Process Governance team to ensure consistency with SAP and Engineering records. A supporting documentation package for metric results was prepared quarterly by the Business Process Governance team, then routed to Gas Senior Leadership approval. The support packages were also reviewed quarterly by Compensation and Internal Audit.

In 2021, the metric was no longer included as a STIP metric; however, the review process established by the Business Process Governance team was maintained.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 GRC safety goal given this metric is a gas transmission, not distribution, related metric. PG&E's ILI Upgrade Program was included in PG&E's 2019 GT&S Rate Case testimony.[18] As of 2021, approximately 46 percent of the system is piggable. In 2021, PG&E inspected a total of 970.5 miles and upgraded 145.6 miles which is a three percent increase to overall piggable mileage.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

[18] See 2019 GT&S Prepared Testimony, Chapter 5, pp. 5-20 through 5-31.

Metric 8: Gas Shut-In Time – Mains

Metric Name and Description: Gas Shut-In Time – Mains – Median time to shut-in gas when an uncontrolled or unplanned gas release occurs on a main. The data used to determine the median time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

Risks: Distribution Pipeline Rupture with Ignition (non-Cross Bore)[19]

Category: Gas

Units: Time in minutes required to stop the flow of gas for Distribution Mains

Summary:

FIGURE 5-8
SHUT IN THE GAS AVG TIME METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: This metric measures the median time required for a qualified PG&E responder to arrive onsite and stop the flow of gas as result of damages impacting gas mains from PG&E's distribution network.

In 2014, PG&E began to measure the time required for resources to respond to and make safe instances of blowing gas on distribution mains.

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[19] The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service.

Specifically measured are distribution events relating to dig-ins, vehicle impacts, explosions and material failures. In 2014, considering from a median standpoint, it required 97 minutes to respond to and make safe events involving distribution mains. In 2021, this response time by PG&E has substantially improved to be 73.3 minutes leading to a reduction by almost 24 percent compared to 2014.

Metric results have improved and have been achieved through the following process improvements implemented in the past nine years:

- Enhanced plastic squeeze capability from approximately 50 percent to all Gas Service Representatives (GSR) < 1.5" plastic pipe;
- Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees;
- Purchased and implemented emergency trailers in every division, allowing for emergency equipment to be accessed quickly and easily;
- Purchased additional steel squeezers for 2-8" steel pipe (housed on emergency trailers);
- Implemented Emergency Management tool (EM tool) to alert maintenance and construction (M&C) of SITG events when notified by third-party emergency organizations;
- Established concurrent response protocol (dispatch M&C and Field Service resources) when notified by emergency agencies;
- Implemented 30-60-90-120+ minute communication protocols between Gas Distribution Control Center (GDCC) and Incident Commander (IC) to ensure consistent communication and issue escalation during events; and
- Tier 3 incident review meetings monthly to share best practices and review long duration events.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Gas Shut-In Time – Main metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for year 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas Shut-In Time – Mains metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Gas Shut-In Time – Main metric.

- **Vice President:** Gas Operations (GO) (1); and
- **Senior Vice President:** GO (1).

Bias Controls: Dispatch incidents are logged and tracked in the EM tool database. The most current system (administered through Dynamic 365, which was implemented in 2018) automatically generates a change log for every notification at the field level to ensure system controls and retention of record history. The data is reviewed by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance to ensure accuracy.

The metric definition for this metric including targets, target setting methodology, and exclusions, are documented and approved by Gas Operations Leadership. Metric results are reported monthly by the Gas Operations Governance Controls and Metrics team and reviewed at leadership meetings to discuss performance and take action. In the event there is a resulting need for additional dollars or resources, approval must be obtained from the Gas Operations Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric (improving the average time required for PG&E to stop the flow of gas during incidents) supports the 2020 GRC safety goal of reducing the gas emergency response time.[20]

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

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20 See 2020 GRC Exhibit (PG&E-12), pp. 14-30 through 14-32.

Metric 9: Shut In The Gas Average Time – Services

Metric Name and Description: Shut In The Gas Average Time – Services—The average time (measured in minutes) that a gas service representative (GSR) or qualified first responder (Gas Crew, Leak Surveyor, etc.) takes to respond and stop gas flow during incidents involving services. The timing for the response starts when the utility first receives the report and ends when the utility's qualified representative determines, per the utility's emergency standards, that the reported leak is not hazardous or the utility's representative completes actions to mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being non-hazardous (i.e., by shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak migration, repair, etc.) per the utility's standards.

Risks: Distribution Pipeline Rupture with Ignition (non-Cross Bore)[21]

Category: Gas

Units: Average (median) response time in minutes

Summary:

FIGURE 5-9
SITG AVG TIME METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



[21] The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of Containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service.

Narrative Context: In 2012, PG&E began to measure the time required to respond to and make safe instances of blowing gas on distribution services. Specifically measured are distribution events relating to dig-ins, vehicle impacts, explosions, material failures and pipeline leaks. In 2012, on average it required 70 minutes to respond to and make safe events involving distribution services. From 2012-2020, that required time has been reduced by 40 percent from 70 minutes down to 41.9 minutes in 2020. Metric results have improved and have been achieved through the following process improvements implemented during the past eight years:

- Enhanced plastic squeeze capability from ~50 percent to all GSRs < 1.5" plastic pipe;
- Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees;
- Purchased and implemented emergency trailers in every division, allowing for emergency equipment to be accessed quickly and easily;
- Purchased additional steel squeezers for 2-8" steel pipe (housed on emergency trailers);
- Implemented Emergency Management tool (EM) tool to alert M&C of SITG events when notified by third-party emergency organizations;
- Established concurrent response protocol (dispatch M&C and Field Service resources) when notified by emergency agencies;
- Implemented 30-60-90-120+ minute communication protocols between GDCC and IC to ensure consistent communication and issue escalation during events; and
- Tier 3 incident review meetings monthly to share best practices and review long duration events.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Shut In The Gas Average Time – Services metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2020.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Shut In The Gas Average Time – Services metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Gas Average Time – Services metric:

- **Vice President:** Gas Operations (GO) (1); and
- **Senior Vice President:** GO (1).

Bias Controls: Dispatch incidents are logged and tracked in the EM tool database. The most current system (administered through Dynamic 365 which was implemented in 2018) automatically generates a change log for every notification down to the field by field basis to ensure system controls and retention of record history. The data is reviewed by the process team to ensure accuracy.

- Monitoring controls also exist for this metric. The metric definition for this metric including targets, target setting methodology, and exclusions, are documented and approved by Gas Operations Leadership. Metric results are reported monthly by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team and reviewed at leadership meetings and huddles to discuss performance and take action. In the event there is a resulting need for additional budget or resources, approval must be obtained from the Gas Operations Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric (improving the average time required for PG&E to stop the flow of gas during incidents) supports the 2020 General Rate Case (GRC) safety goal of reducing the gas emergency response time.[22] The metric supports PG&E's target for this safety goal, which is set at 21.00 minutes, and is based on historical performance, benchmarking data, and PGE's public safety goal.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

[22] See 2020 GRC Exhibit (PG&E-12), pp. 14-30 through 14-32.

Metric 10: Cross Bore Intrusions

Metric Name and Description: Cross Bore Intrusions – Cross bore intrusions found per 1,000 inspections, reported on an annual basis.

Risks: Catastrophic Damage Involving Pipeline Failure[23]

Category: Gas

Units: Number of cross bore intrusions per 1,000 inspections

Summary:

FIGURE 5-10
CROSS BORE INTRUSIONS PER 1,000 INSPECTIONS (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: The Cross Bore Intrusion metric measures the number of cross bores found per 1,000 inspections. A cross bore refers to a gas main or service that has been installed unintentionally, using trenchless technology, through a wastewater or storm drain system. Inspections refer to inspection of potential conflict locations and repair occurrences of cross bore discoveries in any location within PG&E territory. Cross bores pose a risk as they can result in a gas leak into the sewer system if damaged during mechanical sewer cleaning operations which may result in loss of containment and potential migration and

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23 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of Containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service.

ignition of gas. The risk is mitigated by repairing the cross bore after finding it by inspection.

There was an uptick in the find rate and a decrease in the number of inspections completed in 2020 compared to prior years due to a focus on completing work in the City of San Francisco. This area has been identified as the highest risk of potential legacy cross bores, but it is also one of the most difficult geographic locations to perform inspections, which resulted in slower production. However, in 2021, the number of cross bores found is the lowest compared to prior years. This led to a 76% decrease in find rate in 2021 compared to 2020.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Cross Bore Intrusions metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Cross Bore Intrusions metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Cross Bore Intrusions metric.

- **Director:** Gas Operations (1).

Bias Controls: Cross bore inspection counts are logged and tracked within SAP as work is complete based on clerical updates from the field. A validation is conducted by the Distribution Operations team to ensure units and work type are correctly coded (inspection vs. repair) within the database. Cross bores found are logged by the field and tracked by the Cross Bore Program management team. When a potential cross bore intrusion is located, field personnel will contact the Cross Bore Program management team and will also call PGE-5000. This triggers a response for a Gas Service Representative and Locate and Mark operator to help validate the intrusion.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a stated safety goal in the 2020 GRC.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 11: Gas Emergency Response Time

Metric Name and Description: Gas Emergency Response Time – The average and median time in minutes a gas service representative (GSR) (or qualified first responder) takes to respond to a gas-related emergency notification, from the time of notification to the time of onsite arrival. Emergency notifications include all notifications originating from 911 calls and calls made directly to the utility's safety hotlines. The data used to determine the average and median time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric. This information is identical to that of which is included in our Gas Emergency Response BPR and is excel data.

Risks: Distribution Pipeline Rupture with Ignition[24]

Category: Gas

Units: The time in minutes that a GSR (or a qualified first responder) takes to respond after receiving a call which results in an emergency order.

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24 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of Containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-11A
MEDIAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME (ANNUAL)



FIGURE 5-11B
AVERAGE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: The average response time is measured from the time PG&E is notified of the gas emergency order/immediate response (IR) until a GSR or a qualified first responder arrives onsite to the emergency location (including Business Hours and After Hours). PG&E has maintained steady performance for the last several years. From 2011-2021, there has been a 33 percent decrease in the average response time. From 2013-2021, the median time to respond to respond on-site to a gas emergency notification improved by 3 percent. To continuously focus on improving performance, metric results are reported monthly and reviewed at leadership meetings and weekly huddles to discuss results and act as needed.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Gas Emergency Response Time metric was used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas Emergency Response Time metric is linked to 2021 performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Gas Emergency Response Time metric linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: All response times to emergency calls are reviewed by the IR team to determine appropriate exclusions, and the average response time is calculated. Response times are captured electronically using PG&E's Field Automation System and are verified on a sample basis.

Monitoring controls also exist for this metric. The metric definition for this metric including targets, target setting methodology, and exclusions, are documented and approved by Gas Operations Leadership. Metric results are reported monthly by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team and reviewed at leadership meetings to discuss performance and take action. In the event there is a resulting need for additional dollars or resources, approval

must be obtained from the Gas Operations Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

On a quarterly basis, a report package is prepared by the IR team, reviewed by the Business Process Governance team, then routed for Gas Operations Senior Leadership approval. The report package is also reviewed quarterly by Compensation and Internal Audit.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 GRC safety goal.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 12: Natural Gas Storage Baseline Assessments Performed

Metric Name and Description: Natural Gas Storage Baseline Assessments Performed – Tracks the progress of completing baseline and reassessment inspections that were expected to be completed within a given year. It reports the number of storage well baseline assessments completed as a percentage of the number scheduled to be completed in the period. The number scheduled will depend on any regulatory required inspections as well as any initiated by the utility.

Risks: Gas Storage[25]

Category: Gas

Units: Number of Assessments completed/Number scheduled or targeted

Summary:

FIGURE 5-12
STORAGE BASELINE WELL ASSESSMENTS (ANNUAL)



[25] The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Loss of Containment at Natural Gas Storage Well or Reservoir.

Narrative Context: The Natural Gas Storage Baseline Inspections metric measures the number of baseline well assessments performed since 2013. PG&E planned to complete baseline well production casing assessments on 109 wells by 2025 per objectives defined in PG&E's Gas Storage Asset Management Plan and also adjusted to incorporate an accelerated pace required by regulation changes in the storage industry at both federal and state levels. In 2021, PG&E completed 17 well baseline inspections leading to baseline inspections complete on a total of 98 wells from 2013-2021. Thus, PG&E has completed approximately 90 percent of the assessments and is on track in meeting its goals outlined in PG&E's revised plan submitted to the California Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM, previously the California Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR)) for their review and approval January 15, 2021. Further, wells that were inspected in 2013-2016 must be re-baselined using additional well inspection baselining tools that are now required under the new regulations, effective October 2018. The revised plan proposes completion of baseline casing inspections under the full inspection tool suite by 2024; all wells will have been baselined with the original tool by 2023. This plan has been accelerated per the request of CalGEM and is pending their approval.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Natural Gas Storage Baseline Inspections Performed metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Natural Gas Storage Baseline Inspections Performed metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Natural Gas Storage Baseline Inspections Performed metric.

- **Director:** Gas Engineering (1).

Bias Controls: Data Integrity – Project completion (assessment complete) is tracked in the P6 scheduling tool and database and the Reservoir Engineering team is responsible for validating that the assessment is a first-time inspection and not a reinspection of the same well. CalGEM is also responsible for validating work completion as well inspection log survey results must be submitted as part of regulation.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 GRC safety goal given this metric is a gas storage, not distribution, related metric. PG&E's 2019 GT&S Rate Case forecast was based on the final draft CalGEM (previously DOGGR) regulations available at the time of the filing. PG&E's plan reflected casing inspections (a.k.a. barrier inspection surveys) be performed every other year starting in 2019; due to the pending nature of the draft regulations PG&E tentatively forecast to perform them on half of the storage wells in each year; however, filed a brief following publication of final regulations that had previously been interpreted to allow inspection work to be coupled with the conversion to dual barrier over a 7-year period. The Division has changed leadership and that interpretation has shifted, and PG&E is currently engaged with the CalGEM staff to find an inspection schedule that is accelerated to the Division's satisfaction and also maintains reliability for California's natural gas system. In addition, as a result of PG&E's Natural Gas Storage Strategy, PG&E did not forecast to conduct integrity inspection and surveys at the Los Medanos or Pleasant Creek storage wells during the rate case period, however, inspections at each facility have been conducted during the rate case period as the facilities were subject to the final CalGEM regulations.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 13: Gas Pipelines That Can Be Internally Inspected

Metric Name and Description: Gas Pipelines That Can Be Internally Inspected – Total miles and percent of system that can be internally inspected ("pigged") relative to all transmission pipelines in the system.

Risks: Catastrophic Damage Involving High-Pressure Pipeline Failure

Category: Gas

Units: Miles and percentage

Summary:

FIGURE 5-13A
GAS PIPELINES THAT CAN BE INTERNALLY INSPECTED (ANNUAL)



FIGURE 5-13B
GAS PIPELINES THAT CAN BE INTERNALLY INSPECTED (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: In-Line Inspection (ILI) is the most reliable pipeline integrity assessment tool currently available to natural gas pipeline operators to assess the internal and external condition of transmission line pipe. From 2012-2021, there has been an approximate 26 percent increase in system piggability. As of 2021, approximately 46 percent of the system is piggable. In 2021, PG&E inspected a total of 970.5 miles and upgraded 145.6 miles, for a total of 2,957 system piggable miles. This is a three percent increase to overall piggable mileage.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Gas Pipelines That Can Be Internally Inspected metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas Pipelines That Can Be Internally Inspected metric is linked to 2021 Individual or Group Performance Goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Gas Pipelines That Can Be Internally Inspected metric.

- **Director:** Gas Engineering (1)
- **Senior Director:** Gas Engineering (1)
- **Senior Vice President:** Gas Engineering (1)

Bias Controls: Monitoring controls exist for this metric. Metric results are reported monthly by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team and reviewed at leadership meetings and huddles to discuss performance and take action. In the event there is a resulting need for additional dollars or resources, approval must be obtained from the Gas Operations Senior Leadership team at the Work, Finance and Resource Committee meeting.

During the years that this metric was a STIP metric (2014-2018), on a quarterly basis the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team worked to confirm ILI projects and mileage with various stakeholders. Mileage and unit capture dates from the P6 scheduling database were verified by the Gas Operations Business Process Governance team to ensure consistency with SAP and Engineering records. A supporting documentation package for metric results was prepared quarterly by the Business Process Governance team, then routed to Gas Senior Leadership approval. The support packages were also reviewed quarterly by Compensation and Internal Audit.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 GRC safety goal given this metric is a gas transmission, not distribution, related metric. PG&E's ILI Upgrade Program was included in PG&E's 2019 GT&S Rate Case testimony.[26] In 2021 and 2022, PG&E forecasts Traditional ILI Upgrades for an additional approximately 881 miles, bringing the total piggable mileage to approximately 3,697 miles (~56 percent of the system) by the end of 2022. As of 2021, approximately 46 percent of the system is piggable. In 2021, PG&E inspected a total of 970.5 miles and upgraded 145.6 miles which is a three percent increase to overall piggable mileage.

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26 See 2019 GT&S Prepared Testimony, Chapter 5, pp. 5-20 through 5-31.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 14: Employee DART Rate

Metric Name and Description: Employee DART Rate – DART Rate is calculated based on number of OSHA-recordable injuries resulting in Days Away from work and/or Days on Restricted Duty or Job Transfer, and hours worked.

Risks: Employee Safety Incident[27]

Category: Injuries

Units: DART Cases times 200,000 divided by employee hours worked

Summary:

FIGURE 5-14
EMPLOYEE DART CASE RATE METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E began tracking the employee DART Case Rate in 2011. This metric showed an incline from 2012 until 2019 driven primarily by restricted duty cases related to sprains and strains. Since 2019, there has been a 50 percent decrease in the DART rate. Efforts supporting a reduction in the metric include the continued implementation of our on-site clinics strategy, and increasing Industrial Athlete Specialists for job site evaluation. A primary goal of the efforts is to provide injury prevention and early intervention care for employees. In alignment with this, we are strengthening the identification of the

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27 The Corporate Risk Register includes the following risk: Employee Safety Incident.

highest risk work groups for vehicle ergonomic injuries and computer use, and providing our people leaders with additional injury management training. We also required at-home ergonomic workstation evaluations throughout the pandemic.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Employee DART Rate metric was used as a STIP metric for 2021. This metric included LOB specific DART Rates for Electric Operations, Gas Operations, and Generation, with targets that supported the Enterprise-wide DART goal.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Employee DART Rate metric is linked to 2021 individual performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the DART rate metric was linked to Executive positions as a STIP metric.

Bias Controls: Yes. OSHA regulates the definition of a DART case and we rely on the physician determination of work relatedness and need for time off or restricted duty. Internal Audit completed an audit of the DART classifications in 2019 to verify that bias controls are in place and effective.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: The metric is stated in 2020 GRC Safety and Health chapter (Chapter 1).[28] The year-end target for DART rate in 2021 was 0.91. The end of year target for 2022 is 0.86. As previously mentioned, since 2019 there has been a 50 percent decrease in the employee DART rate. The annual average number of DART cases were used in the 2020 RAMP model consequence analysis for the Employee Safety Incident risk.[29] RAMP

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28 PG&E 2020 GRC Exhibit (PG&E-7), Chapter 1, Safety and Health , p. 1-19.

29 PG&E 2020 RAMP Report, Chapter 16, Risk Mitigation Plan: Employee Safety Incident.

model results for the risk reduction programs being implemented indicate a reduction in employee DART cases through 2026.

The 12-month rolling average DART case rate is a Key Risk Indicator for the Employee Safety Incident risk. This metric is track and trend only.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 15: Rate of Serious Injuries or Fatalities (SIF) Actual (Employee)

Metric Name and Description: Rate of SIF Actual (Employee) is calculated using the formula: Number of SIF-Actual cases among employees x 200,000/ employee hours worked, where SIF Actual is counted using the methodology developed by the Edison Electric Institute's (EEI) Occupational Safety and Health Committee (OS&HC) Safety and Classification Learning (SCL) Model.

If a utility has implemented a replicable substantially similar evaluation methodology for assessing SIF Actual, the utility may use that method for reporting this metric. If a utility opts to report the rate of SIF Actual using a method other than the EEI Safety Classification Model, it must explain how its methodology for counting SIF Actual differs and why it chose to use it.

As a supplemental reporting requirement to the SIF Actual (SIF-A) Rate for comparative purposes, all utilities shall also provide SIF-A data based on California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) reporting requirements under Section 6409.1 of the California Labor Code.

Risks: Employee Safety Incident

Category: Injuries

Units: Rate of SIF-Actual (SIF-A) cases among employees x 200,000/employee hours worked

Summary:

FIGURE 5-15
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (EMPLOYEE) EEI SCL MODEL AND CAL/OSHA[(a)] DEFINITIONS COMPARISON



(a) Per Cal/OSHA, a serious injury or illness is defined as one involving inpatient hospitalization, regardless of length of time, for other than medical observation or diagnostic testing; amputation; loss of an eye; or serious degree of permanent disfigurement.

Narrative Context: Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a classification and cause evaluation process for coworker and contractor serious injuries or fatalities.[30] The goal of PG&E's SIF Program is to reduce the number and severity of safety incidents that result in a SIF. The program objective is to learn from safety incidents by performing cause evaluations on each SIF-Actual

30 Per I.14-08-022, Kern Order Instituting Investigation (Kern OII) (Aug. 28, 2014) Settlement Agreement with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) see D.15-07-014.

(SIF-A) and SIF Potential (SIF-P) incident, implementing corrective actions, and sharing key findings across the enterprise.

In August of 2020, PG&E adopted Edison Electric International's (EEI) Safety Classification Learning (SCL) Model to mature classification of its SIF incidents.[31] Adopting the EEI SCL Model has improved PG&E's SIF Program by bringing a consistent and objective approach to reviewing and classifying SIF incidents and identifying high-energy tasks. The EEI SCL model does not directly define a SIF-A, rather it classifies incidents into categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),[32] Low-Energy SIF (LSIF),[33] Potential SIF (PSIF),[34] Capacity,[35] Exposure,[36] Success,[37] and Low Severity.[38] The HSIF terminology is fairly new to the industry; however, it is equivalent to a SIF-A with regard to how serious life threatening, life-altering or fatalities are determined.[39]

While PG&E uses the EEI SCL model methodology to classify and track SIF-A incidents, PG&E's SIF Program differs slightly from the EEI model in that PG&E includes all types of Motor Vehicle Incidents (MVI) in its SIF counts, whereas the EEI SCL model does not.[40] PG&E believes that all MVIs (even where any injury

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31 See, SCL Model at https://esafetyline.net/eei/docs/eeiSCLmodel.pdf at p. 17.

32 *Id*. at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

33 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

34 *Id*. at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

35 *Id*. at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

36 *Id*. at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: "Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control."

37 *Id*. at p. 17, Success is defined as: "Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control."

38 *Id*. at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained."

39 EEI Safety Classification and Learning (SCL) Model, Serious Injury or Fatality defined as Life-threatening or life-altering incident.

40 This has been discussed during learning sessions with EEI and conversations with the SCL author that some MVIs do not fit within the parameters of the SCL model. PG&E uses its own MVI SIF classification process per SAFE-1002S: Motor Vehicle Standard, which is outside the SCL model classification process.

did not occur) should be considered for SIF potentiality and will continue to include them in the SIF counts. This may differ slightly from how other utilities classify and categorize MVIs.

This SPM definition includes the use of the EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria,[41] which defines a serious injury using fourteen specific injury criteria. In operation, and in discussions with peer utilities and EEI, PG&E finds that the OS&HC criteria does not align with the life altering/life threatening aspects of the SIF Program objective and is in contradiction to the SCL model purpose. PG&E does, however, define serious injury in its SIF Program,[42] which is substantially similar to the OS&HC criteria. The difference is that PG&E considers life altering/life threating a substantial factor in serious injury determination.[43]

As allowed by CPUC SPM definition for a SIF-A (Employee) incident, PG&E uses substantially similar criteria to classify an injury as serious as compared to the EEI OS&HC criteria including life threatening/life altering into the SIF-A determination. This determination also includes a third-party medical consultant to review and concur with the serious designation. This model allows the Company to focus its safety and risk mitigation efforts on the most serious outcomes and highest risk work where a high energy incident occurred.

There have been seven SIF-A Employee incidents between 2017 and 2020, which include three fatalities and four serious injuries. The events involved injuries caused by an intentional act of violence by a third-party, electrical contacts, and MVIs (including Off-Road Utility Vehicles (OUV)). Corrective

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41 Occupational Safety & Health Committee: Serious Injury & Fatality Criteria (SIF) can be reviewed at: https://images.magnetmail.net/images/clients/EEI_//attach/Environment/hsif2022.pdf.

42 SAFE-1100S: Serious Injury or Fatality Standard, Appendix A Examples of a Serious Injury.

43 Per SAFE-1100S: PG&E defines a SIF-A (analogous to a EEI SCL HSIF) as: A work-related high-energy incident consequential from work at or for PG&E that results in any of the following to employees, contractors, or directly supervised contractors:

- A fatality – work-related fatal injury or illness;
- A life-threatening injury or illness that required immediate life-preserving action that if not applied immediately would likely have resulted in the death of that person;
- A life-altering injury or illness that resulted in a permanent and significant loss of a major body part or organ function.

actions have been taken to address the identified causes and prevent potential future similar outcomes that could lead to a SIF-A event, including:

- Eliminated OUVs from use within PG&E, including rental of OUV;
- Standing down all barehand electrical work until further notice; and
- Establishing the Enterprise Safe Access Asset Program Proposal to inspect and maintain PG&E access assets.

There were no SIF-A (Employee incidents) in 2021.

The implementation of the Enterprise Safety Management System and stronger focus on workforce safety initiatives, such as development of critical risk standards, enhancing the field safety observations program, leader engagement, and lean operating model, will continue to reduce this trend.

With regard to Cal/OSHA reporting requirements, there was only one serious incident involving an apprentice lineman performing pole work. A causal evaluation was performed and corrective actions implemented, including a change to the standard.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Rate of SIF-A (Employee) metric was used as a STIP metric for 2021. It was measured in combination with the SIF-A (Contractor) metric and included serious injuries only.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Rate of SIF-A (Employee) metric is linked to 2021 performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher as a subset of SIF that includes serious injuries only.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Rate of SIF-A (Employee) metric is a measure of risk reduction for the Employee Safety Incident risk. It is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: Data is compiled by the Enterprise Health & Safety Team. Employee SIF events are reviewed weekly. Internal Audit reviews classifications for adherence to the procedure.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric is not specifically stated in the 2020 GRC as a safety goal metric.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 16: Rate of Serious Injuries or Fatalities (SIF) Actual (Contractor)

Metric Name and Description: Rate of SIF Actual (Contractor) is calculated using the formula: Number of SIF-Actual cases among employees x 200,000/ employee hours worked, where SIF Actual is counted using the methodology developed by the Edison Electric Institute's (EEI) Occupational Safety and Health Committee (OS&HC) Safety and Classification Learning (SCL) Model.

If a utility has implemented a replicable, substantially similar evaluation methodology for assessing incidents where a SIF occurred, the utility may use that method for reporting this metric. If a utility opts to report the rate of SIF Actual using a method other than the EEI SCL Model, it must explain how its methodology for counting SIF-A differs and why it chose to use it.

As a supplemental reporting requirement to the SIF-A Rate for comparative purposes, all utilities shall also report SIF-A Rate data based on California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) reporting requirements under Section 6409.1 of the California Labor Code

Risks: Contractor Safety Incident
Category: Injuries
Units: Rate of SIF Actual (SIF-A) cases among employees x 200,000/contractor hours worked

Summary:

FIGURE 5-16
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (CONTRACTOR) EEI SCL MODEL AND CAL/OSHA[(a)] DEFINITIONS COMPARISON



(a) Per Cal/OSHA, a serious injury or illness is defined as one involving inpatient hospitalization, regardless of length of time, for other than medical observation or diagnostic testing; amputation; loss of an eye; or serious degree of permanent disfigurement.

Narrative Context: Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a classification and cause evaluation process for coworker and contractor SIF.[44] The goal of PG&E's SIF Program is to reduce the number and severity of safety incidents that result in a SIF. The program objective is to learn from safety incidents by performing cause evaluations on each SIF-Actual (SIF-A) and SIF

[44] Per I.14-08-022, Kern Order Instituting Investigation (Kern OII) (Aug. 28, 2014) Settlement Agreement with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) see D.15-07-014.

Potential (SIF-P) incident, implementing corrective actions, and sharing key findings across the enterprise.

In August of 2020, PG&E adopted Edison Electric International's (EEI) Safety Classification Learning (SCL) Model to mature classification of its SIF incidents.[45] Adopting the EEI SCL Model has improved PG&E's SIF Program by bringing a consistent and objective approach to reviewing and classifying SIF incidents and identifying high-energy tasks. The EEI SCL model does not directly define a SIF-A, rather it classifies incidents into categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),[46] Low-Energy SIF (LSIF),[47] Potential SIF (PSIF),[48] Capacity,[49] Exposure,[50] Success,[51] and Low Severity.[52] The HSIF terminology is fairly new to the industry; however, it is equivalent to a SIF-A with regard to how serious life threatening, life-altering or fatalities are determined.[53]

While PG&E uses the EEI SCL model methodology to classify and track SIF-A incidents, PG&E's SIF Program differs slightly from the EEI model in that PG&E includes all types of Motor Vehicle Incidents (MVI) in its SIF counts, whereas the EEI SCL model does not.[54] PG&E believes that all MVIs (even where any injury

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45 See, SCL Model at https://esafetyline.net/eei/docs/eeiSCLmodel.pdf at p. 17.

46 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

47 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

48 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

49 *Id.* at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

50 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: "Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control."

51 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: "Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control."

52 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained."

53 EEI Safety Classification and Learning (SCL) Model, SIF defined as Life-threatening or life-altering incident.

54 This has been discussed during learning sessions with EEI and conversations with the SCL author that some MVIs do not fit within the parameters of the SCL model. PG&E uses its own MVI SIF classification process per SAFE-1002S: Motor Vehicle Standard, which is outside the SCL model classification process.

did not occur) should be considered for SIF potentiality and will continue to include them in the SIF counts. This may differ slightly from how other utilities classify and categorize contractor MVIs.

This SPM definition includes the use of the EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria,[55] which defines a serious injury using fourteen specific injury criteria. In operation, and in discussions with other utilities and EEI, PG&E finds that the OS&HC criteria does not align with the life altering/life threatening aspects of the SIF Program objective and is in contradiction to the SCL model purpose. PG&E does, however, define serious injury in its SIF Program,[56] which is substantially similar to the OS&HC criteria. The difference is that PG&E considers life altering/life threating a substantial factor in serious injury determination.[57]

As allowed by CPUC SPM definition for a SIF-A (Employee) incident, PG&E uses substantially similar criteria to classify an injury as serious, as compared to the EEI OS&HC criteria including life threatening/life altering into the SIF-A determination. This determination also includes a third-party medical consultant to review and concur with the serious designation. This model allows the Company to focus its safety and risk mitigation efforts on the most serious outcomes and highest risk work where a high energy incident occurred.

There have been 21 SIF-A Contractor incidents between 2017 and 2021, which include 10 fatalities and 11 serious injuries. There is no common thread between the incidents. The SIF-A events encompass broad job task types including, helicopter operations, dropped objects, vegetation management, MVI

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55 Occupational Safety & Health Committee: Serious Injury & Fatality Criteria (SIF) can be reviewed at: https://images.magnetmail.net/images/clients/EEI_//attach/Environment/hsif2022.pdf.

56 SAFE-1100S: Serious Injury or Fatality Standard, Appendix A Examples of a Serious Injury.

57 PG&E defines a SIF-A (analogous to a EEI SCL HSIF) as: A work-related high-energy incident consequential from work at or for PG&E that results in any of the following to employees, contractors, or directly supervised contractors:

- A fatality – work-related fatal injury or illness;
- A life-threatening injury or illness that required immediate life-preserving action that if not applied immediately would likely have resulted in the death of that person;
- A life-altering injury or illness that resulted in a permanent and significant loss of a major body part or organ function.

or Off-Highway Utility Vehicles, and electrical contacts. Six contractor SIF-A incidents occurred in 2021. There were three contractor fatalities:

- March 2021: A team of Pre-inspectors working in Watsonville. A car hit one of the Pre-inspectors and knocked them over an embankment which resulted in a fatality.

- May 2021: A two-man crew with was tasked with installing ground rods as part of lightning arrestor work on a PG&E project work site in Humboldt County. The groundman was fatally injured while performing excavation work with a mini excavator on a dirt-sloped hill.

- June 2021: A contractor was fatally injured in a vehicle incident while performing electric transmission inspection-related work where the vehicle rolled down a steep hill.

The remaining three injuries include two concussions, one from a MVI and the other from being hit in the head with a power tool, and trauma to internal organs from a tree split incident that pinned the contractor against the tree.

With regard to Cal/OSHA reporting requirements, there were 13 contractor incidents primarily related to falls during vegetation management work.

Implementation of Contractor Safety Program (CSP), in addition to executing corrective actions will drive down incidents. The CSP, evaluated as part of the 2020 RAMP Report, is in progress through 2026. Please see Metric 19 narrative for additional detail about the additional programs being implemented.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the Rate of SIF-Actual (Contractor) metric was used as a STIP metric for 2021. It was measured in combination with the SIF-Actual (Employee) metric and included serious injuries only.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Rate of SIF-Actual (Contractor) metric is linked to 2021 performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher as a subset of SIF that includes serious injuries only.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Rate of SIF-Actual (Contractor) metric is a measure of risk reduction for the Contractor Safety Incident risk. It is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: Data is compiled by the Enterprise Health & Safety Team. Contractor SIF events are reviewed weekly and reviewed by internal audit.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric is not specifically stated in the 2020 GRC as a safety goal metric. This metric is tracked internally as track and trend only.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 17: Rate of Serious Injuries or Fatalities (SIF) Potential (Employee)

Metric Name and Description: Rate of SIF Potential (Employee) is calculated using the formula:

Number of SIF Potential cases among employees x 200,000/employee hours worked, where a SIF incident, in this case would be events that could have led to a reportable SIF. Potential SIF incidents are identified using the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) Safety Classification and Learning Model.[58]

If a utility has implemented a replicable, substantially similar evaluation methodology for assessing SIF Potential (SIF-P), the utility may use that method for reporting this metric. If a utility opts to report the rate of SIF-P using a method other than the EEI Safety Classification Model, it must explain how its methodology for counting SIF-P differs and why it chose to use it.

As a supplemental reporting requirement to the rate of SIF Potential (Employee), all utilities shall provide information about the key lessons learned from Potential SIF (Employee) incidents.

Risks: Employee Safety Incident
Category: Injuries and Near Hits
Units: Number of SIF-Potential (SIF-P) cases among employees x 200,000/employee hours worked

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58 Edison Electric Institute Safety Classification and Learning Model at: https://esafetyline.net/eei/docs/eeiSCLmodel.pdf.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-17
RATE OF SERIOUS INJURIES OR FATALITIES (SIF) POTENTIAL (EMPLOYEE)



Narrative Context: PG&E's SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a classification and cause evaluation process for coworker and contractor serious injuries or fatalities.[59] The goal of PG&E's SIF program is to reduce the number and severity of safety incidents that result in a SIF. The program objective is to learn from safety incidents by performing cause evaluations on each SIF-Actual (SIF-A) and SIF Potential (SIF-P) incident, implementing corrective actions, and sharing key findings across the enterprise.

From 2016 to mid-2020, SIF-P classification was based on the reasonable chance that the incident could have resulted in a SIF-A.[60] This classification was subjective and left room for interpretation. In August of 2020, PG&E adopted Edison Electric International's Safety Classification Learning (SCL)

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59 Per Investigation 14-08-022, Kern Order Instituting Investigation (Kern OII) (Aug. 28, 2014) Settlement Agreement with California Public Utilities Commission see Decision 15-07-014.

60 SAFE-1100P-01 Rev.0 Published 03/31/0217.

Model to classify its serious injury or fatality (SIF) incidents.[61] Adopting the EEI SCL Model improved PG&E's SIF program by bringing a consistent and objective approach to reviewing and classifying SIF incidents and identifying high-energy tasks. The EEI SCL model classifies incidents into very distinct categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),[62] Low-Energy SIF (LSIF),[63] Potential SIF (PSIF),[64] Capacity,[65] Exposure,[66] Success[67] & Low Severity.[68] PG&E has fully adopted the PSIF terminology into its SIF Program.[69]

While PG&E uses the EEI SCL model methodology to classify and track SIF incidents, PG&E's SIF program differs slightly from the EEI model in that PG&E includes all types of Motor Vehicle Incidents (MVI) in its SIF counts, whereas the EEI SCL model does not.[70] PG&E believes that all motor vehicle incidents (even where any injury did not occur) should be considered for SIF potentiality and will continue to include them in the SIF counts. This may differ slightly from how other utilities classify and categorize MVIs.

In 2020 and 2021, PG&E saw a slight decrease in SIF-P Employee incidents.. The most common events involved motor vehicle incidents. Motor vehicle

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61 See, SCL Model at https://esafetyline.net/eei/docs/eeiSCLmodel.pdf at p. 17.

62 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

63 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

64 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

65 *Id.* at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

66 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: "Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control."

67 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: "Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control."

68 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained."

69 SAFE-1100S Rev 5, p. 10. Also, see SAFE-1100S Rev 5 Attachment 1, SIF Determination Flowchart

70 This has been discussed during learning sessions with EEI and conversations with the SCL author that some MVI's do not fit within the parameters of the SCL model. PG&E uses its own MVI SIF classification process per SAFE-1002S: Motor Vehicle Standard, which is outside the SCL model classification process.

program improvements have been taken to address contractor incidents including, installing driver technology to monitor and track driver habits, i.e., acceleration, hard braking, speed, etc.

Continued measures are being implemented by the addition of the Regional Safety Directors through safety campaigns and communications and problem-solving sessions. The implementation of the Enterprise Safety Management System and stronger focus on workforce safety initiatives, such as development of critical risk standards, enhancing the field safety observations program, leader engagement, and lean operating model, is expected to continue to reduce this trend.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Rate of SIF Potential (Employee) metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Rate of SIF Potential (Employee) metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Rate of SIF Potential (Employee) metric:

- **Director:** Customer Care (2), Electric Engineering (2), Electric Operations (3), Shared Services (3), Supply Chain (1);
- **Senior Director:** Electric Operations (1), Wildfire Risk; and
- **Vice President:** Shared Services (2).

Bias Controls: SIF events are reviewed weekly by Enterprise Health & Safety

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric is not specifically stated in the 2020 GRC as a safety goal metric. This metric is tracked internally as track and trend only.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 18: Rate of Serious Injuries or Fatalities (SIF) Potential (Contractor)

Metric Name and Description: Rate of SIF Potential (contractor) is calculated using the formula:

Number of SIF Potential cases among contractors x 200,000/contractor hours worked, where a SIF incident, in this case would be events that could have led to a reportable SIF. Potential SIF incidents are identified using the EEI Safety Classification and Learning Model.[71]

If a utility has implemented a replicable, substantially similar evaluation methodology for assessing SIF Potential (SIF-P), the utility may use that method for reporting this metric. If a utility opts to report the rate of SIF-P using a method other than the EEI Safety Classification Model, it must explain how its methodology for counting SIF-P differs and why it chose to use it.

As a supplemental reporting requirement to the Rate of SIF Potential (Contractor), all utilities shall provide information about key lessons learned from SIF-P (Contractor) incidents.

Risks: Contractor Safety Incident
Category: Injuries & Near Hits
Units: Number of SIF-Potential (SIF-P) cases among employees x 200,000/contractor hours worked

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71 Edison Electric Institute Safety Classification and Learning Model at: https://esafetyline.net/eei/docs/eeiSCLmodel.pdf.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-18
RATE OF SERIOUS INJURIES OR FATALITIES (SIF) POTENTIAL (CONTRACTOR)



Narrative Context: PG&E's Serious Injury or Fatality (SIF) program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a classification and cause evaluation process for coworker and contractor serious injuries or fatalities.[72] The goal of PG&E's SIF program is to reduce the number and severity of safety incidents that result in a SIF. The program objective is to learn from safety incidents by performing cause evaluations on each SIF-Actual (SIF-A) and SIF Potential (SIF-P) incident, implementing corrective actions, and sharing key findings across the enterprise. When it was deployed only contractor incidents that resulted in a SIF-A[73] were investigated by PG&E. The contractor was

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72 Per I.14-08-022, Kern Order Instituting Investigation (Kern OII) (Aug. 28, 2014) Settlement Agreement with California Public Utilities Commission see Decision 15-07-014.

73 Per SAFE-1100S Rev.00 (2017): Serious Injury or Fatality Standard, An incident resulting in a fatality or serious injury that was life threatening or life altering.

responsible for investigating all other incidents and reporting action plans back to PG&E.

In June of 2020, PG&E expanded the SIF program to include investigating contractor incidents rising to SIF-P classification.[74] This increased the number and types of injuries and incidents that contractors are required to report in 2020 and 2021.

From 2017 to mid-2020, SIF-P classification was based on the reasonable chance that the incident could have resulted in a SIF-A.[75] This classification was subjective and left room for interpretation. In August of 2020, PG&E adopted Edison Electric International's Safety Classification Learning (SCL) Model to classify its serious injury or fatality (SIF) incidents.[76] Adopting the EEI SCL Model improved PG&E's SIF program by bringing a consistent and objective approach to reviewing and classifying SIF incidents and identifying high-energy tasks. The EEI SCL model classifies incidents into very distinct categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),[77] Low-Energy SIF (LSIF),[78] Potential SIF

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74 SAFE-1100S-B001: Contractor SIF-P Incidents: Requiring SIF-P Incidents and Cause Evaluations Published 6/2020.

75 SAFE-1100P-01 Rev.0 Published 03/31/0217.

76 See, SCL Model at https://esafetyline.net/eei/docs/eeiSCLmodel.pdf at p. 17.

77 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

78 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

(PSIF),[79] Capacity,[80] Exposure,[81] Success[82] & Low Severity.[83] PG&E has fully adopted the PSIF terminology into its SIF Program.[84]

While PG&E uses the EEI SCL model methodology to classify and track SIF incidents, PG&E's SIF program differs slightly from the EEI model in that PG&E includes all types of Motor Vehicle Incidents (MVI) in its SIF counts, whereas the EEI SCL model does not.[85] PG&E believes that all motor vehicle incidents (even where any injury did not occur) should be considered for SIF potentiality and will continue to include them in the SIF counts. This may differ slightly from how other utilities classify and categorize MVIs.

Between 2020 and 2021, there have been a total of 51 SIF-P contractor incidents. The most common events involved electrical contacts, motor vehicle incidents and falls from heights (electrical poles and trees). Program improvements have been taken to address contractor incidents including:

- Improving contractor engagement and oversight, including stronger punitive actions for not meeting safety standards; and
- Partnering with the IBEW and the Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee of the California-Nevada Line Construction Industry (California-Nevada JATC) in creating and maintaining a system that will

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79 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

80 *Id.* at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

81 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: "Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control."

82 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: "Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control."

83 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained."

84 SAFE-1100S Rev 5, p. 10. Also, see SAFE-1100S Rev 5 Attachment 1, SIF Determination Flowchart.

85 This has been discussed during learning sessions with EEI and conversations with the SCL author that some MVI's do not fit within the parameters of the SCL model. PG&E uses its own MVI SIF classification process per SAFE-1002S: Motor Vehicle Standard, which is outside the SCL model classification process.

educate and assess line clearance tree trimmers from Step 1 to the Journey level.

Continued measures are being implemented by the addition of the Regional Safety Directors through safety campaigns and communications, problem-solving sessions and contractor safety oversight improvement. The implementation of the Enterprise Safety Management System (SMS) and stronger focus on workforce safety initiatives, such as development of critical risk standards, enhancing the field safety observations program, leader engagement, and lean operating model, is expected to help reduce SIF-P events involving contractors.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Rate of SIF Potential (contractor) metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Rate of SIF Potential (contractor) metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the SPM 18 metric:

- **Director:** Customer Care (2), Electric Engineering (2), Electric Operations (3), Shared Services (3);
- **Senior Director:** Electric Operations (1), Shared Services (1), Wildfire Risk (1); and
- **Vice President:** Shared Services (1).

Bias Controls: SIF events are reviewed weekly by Enterprise Health & Safety

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: A rate of SIF Potential (Contractor) metric is not stated in the 2020 GRC Safety and Health chapter (Chapter 1). This metric is tracked internally as track and trend only.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 19: Contractor DART

Metric Name and Description: Contractor DART – DART Rate: DART Cases include OSHA-recordable LWD Cases and injuries that involve job transfer or restricted work activity. DART Rate is calculated as DART Cases times 200,000 divided by contractor hours worked.[86]

Risks: Contractor Safety Incident[87]

Category: Injuries

Units: OSHA recordable times 200,000 divided by contractor hours worked associated with work for the reporting utility

Summary:

FIGURE 5-19
CONTRACTOR DART RATE METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: Contractor DART case rate data became available with the implementation of the Contractor Safety Program which was fully in place at the beginning of 2017. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) did not track this metric prior to 2017. Data show that DART case rates for PG&E contractors

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86 Contractors included are performing medium to high-risk work.

87 The Corporate Risk Register includes the following risk: Contractor Safety Incident.

decreased from 2018 through 2021 with the increase in the PG&E contractor workforce. This is due to the Contractor Safety pre-qualification and Line of Business oversight programs; these control programs are being strengthened. Additional mitigative measures were also proposed as part of the 2020 Risk Assessment Mitigation Phase (RAMP) Report[88] and are planned through 2026.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Contractor DART metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Contractor DART metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Contractor DART metric:

- **Director:** Customer Care (5), Electric Engineering (8), Electric Operations (EO) (20), Enterprise Health & Safety (2), Finance (2), Gas Engineering (2), Gas Operations (1), Generation (12), Human Resources & Enterprise Change Office (1), Information Technology (IT) (18), Operations (3), Shared Services (1), Wildfire Risk (11);
- **Senior Director:** Corporate Affairs (1), Customer Care (2), Electric Engineering (1), EO (8), Generation (3), IT (4), Shared Services (1), Wildfire Risk (2);
- **Vice President:** Customer and Communications (1), Customer Care (2), EO (3), Generation (2), IT (1), Wildfire Risk (1); and
- **Senior Vice President:** EO (1), Enterprise Health & Safety (1).

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88 PG&E 2020 RAMP Report, A.20-06-012 (June 30, 2020), Ch. 17, Contractor Safety Incident.

Bias Controls: OSHA regulates the definition of a DART case. The PG&E specific information is self-reported by the contractors. The contractor company OSHA logs are verified annually by an external third party.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric was not a stated metric in the 2020 GRC Enterprise Safety and Health chapter (Chapter 1). The Narrative Context section above summarizes the continued steps PG&E is taking to reduce the Contractor DART Rate.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 20: Public SIF

Metric Name and Description: Public serious injuries or fatalities (SIF) – A fatality or personal injury requiring in-patient hospitalization involving utility facilities or equipment. Equipment includes utility vehicles used during the course of business.

Risks: Third-Party Safety Incident (Public Safety)[89]

Category: Injuries

Units: Number of SIF

Summary:

[89] The Corporate Risk Register includes the following risk: Third-Party Safety Incident.

FIGURE 5-20
PUBLIC SIF METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Note: At this time PG&E has included wildfires reported from 2015 through 2021, reported wildfires in 2017 (Sawmill, Atlas, Redwood Valley, Nuns, and Cascade) are under review.

Narrative Context: The Public SIF metric includes all public safety incidents involving a Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) asset, where a member of the public was seriously injured, regardless of assigned fault. The data is reported by the total number of injuries per incident. In general, the number of Public SIF incidents (and injuries) has trended down since 2014, with the exception of the incidents in 2018 due to wildfires. Excluding wildfire, the primary drivers for the incidents include motor vehicle/distribution pole incidents, third-party electrical contact, and incidents on PG&E hydroelectric owned or managed property including drownings.[90]

In 2021, there were 15 confirmed Public Safety Incidents meeting the Safety Performance Metric Public SIF definition (involving a PG&E asset regardless of fault) that resulting in 8 serious injuries and 12 fatalities. There is one event pending review related to the Dixie Wildfire. The confirmed public incidents included:

- Six electrical contacts (3 serious injuries, 3 fatalities);
- Three car-pole incidents (1 serious injury, 5 fatalities);
- Three Company or Contractor Motor Vehicle Incidents (3 fatalities); and
- Three incidents involving members of the public using a PG&E owned waterway or roadway (4 serious injuries, 1 fatality).

The downward trend in public safety incidents can be attributed to the broader asset management programs in Electric Operations (EO) (including Wildfire mitigation), Gas Operations (GO) and Power Generation. In 2020, a risk was added to the PG&E enterprise risk register to place increased emphasis on Public SIF that are unrelated to a PG&E asset failure or incorrect operations. The risk reduction plan leverages Line of Business controls and mitigations specific to public safety including EO, GO, and Hydroelectric Operations Public Awareness and Job Site Safety programs, EO Transmission and Distribution safety design requirements, GO physical security controls including Meter Protection, and Hydroelectric Dam Surveillance monitoring and warning systems and signage. Mitigation programs being implemented include canals and waterways barrier installation and EO system hardening.

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90 For Fire Ignition metric information see Metric 4. For electrical contact information see Metrics 1 and 2. Public SIF related to the failure of an asset are included in the risk analysis for asset-based event risks.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Public SIF metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Public SIF metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Public SIF metric:

- **Chief:** General Counsel and Compliance & Ethics (1), Generation (2);
- **Director:** Customer Care (3), Electric Engineering (5), EO (10), Enterprise Health & Safety (2), Gas Engineering (1), Generation (10), Information Technology (17), Wildfire Risk (2);
- **Senior Director:** Corporate Affairs (1), Customer Care (1), Electric Engineering (1), EO (3), Generation (3), Information Technology (5);
- **Vice President:** Customer Care (1), EO (2), Generation (2), Information Technology (1);
- **Senior Vice President:** Information Technology (1); and
- **Executive Vice President.**

Bias Controls: This data is reviewed and compiled by PG&E's Law Dept.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: The Third-Party Safety Incident risk was added to the PG&E event-based risk register in 2020 to place greater emphasis on third party safety incidents that do not involve the failure of a PG&E asset. A third-party safety incident metric is not stated in the 2020 GRC Safety and Health chapter (Chapter 1).

The Third-Party SIF metric dataset was used in the 2020 RAMP analysis for the Third-Party Safety Incident risk.[91] RAMP model results for the risk reduction

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91 PG&E 2020 RAMP Report, Chapter 15, Risk Mitigation Plan: Third-Party Safety Incident.

programs being implemented indicate a reduction in third-party SIF incidents that do not involve the failure of an asset through 2026. See the Narrative Context explanation above for explanation of steps PG&E is taking to reduce the Public SIF rate.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 21: Helicopter/Flight Accident or Incident

Metric Name and Description: Helicopter/Flight Accident or Incident – Defined by Federal Aviation Regulations, reportable to the Federal Aviation Administration per 49-CFR-830.

Risks: Aviation Incident, Third Party Safety Incident, Contractor Safety Incident, and Employee Safety Incident.[92]

Category: Vehicle

Units: Number of accidents or incidents (as defined in 49 CFR Section 830.5 "Immediate Notification") per 100,000 flight hours.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-21
HELICOPTER/FLIGHT ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: For the past 10 years, there have been four reportable incidents per 49 CFR 830.5.

- August 13, 2013: A contractor fixed wing patrol aircraft was performing a gas transmission pipeline patrol with a contract aerial patroller near the town of Paradise. The NTSB determined that during the patrol, while orbiting

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92 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Aviation Incident, Employee Safety Incident, Contractor Safety Incident, and Third-party Safety Incident.

near a canyon, the pilot failed to maintain control of the aircraft while encountering an updraft. The aircraft collided with terrain near the bottom of a canyon and was consumed by post impact fire. Both the pilot and patroller were fatally injured.

- July 11, 2017: Helicopter was attempting to land at an unimproved landing site near a dam when just prior to touchdown, the helicopter's main rotor struck a tree causing it to suddenly fall several feet to the ground resulting in severe damage to the helicopter and minor injuries to several passengers.
- June 2, 2020: Helicopter was performing Human External Cargo operations transporting two contract employees in support of a transmission project when it struck and severed the bottom phase of an energized transmission circuit. The helicopter lost lift, impacted the ground and came to rest at the bottom of a hill resulting in fatal injuries to the contract pilot and two contract employees.
- July 20, 2020: Helicopter was performing aerial powerline patrols with two PG&E employees when smoke was detected in the aircraft. An immediate emergency landing was initiated. Just prior to landing, engine power was lost, and the helicopter impacted the ground in an upright position. The pilot and two employees egressed as the smoke intensified. The helicopter caught fire and was subsequently consumed. There was one minor injury to an employee.

PG&E's internal evaluations resulted in the following actions to improve PG&E processes and systems. The learnings also informed training and guidance documents.

PG&E created a requirement that aircraft must not, under any circumstances, fly underneath wires of any kind. This is applicable to all helicopter operations. Additionally, all Human External Cargo (HEC) insertions and extractions may only take place at established landing zones or approved work locations. (Guidance Document Reference AVI-3001M)

The number of Helicopter Operations Specialists is being increased from three to six. This is an increase in field oversight, safety and expertise in the area of helicopter operations to support the broad PG&E service area for employee and contractor work.

Revisions were made to the Helicopter Operations Field Manual, Chapter 2 Patrolling, to include improvements to the emergency landing procedures and added additional requirements to the pilot's preflight briefing. (Guidance Document Reference AVI-3001M)

Revisions were made to the Helicopter Operations Field Manual, Chapter 2 Patrolling, to include requirements that only three-point or four-point seat restraints are to be used by passengers and prohibits the use of lap-belt only seats. This is essential to ensure adequate restraint during emergency landings and to reduce potential injuries (Guidance Document Reference AVI-3001M).

Helicopter Operations, working with Enterprise Health and Safety, and research of industry best practices will evaluate helicopter mission profiles to determine those that have the greatest risk of emergency landings and pose threats to occupants. They will establish the minimum PPE requirements for head protection and Fire Resistant (FR) clothing to be worn by employees and contractors flying in low altitude line patrols and other evaluated missions. These requirements will be documented in AVI-3001M.

PG&E Aviation Services took action in 2021 to focus on improvements to their Safety Management System.

Aviation solicited a third-party audit by an industry leader, Safety Operating Systems, LLC.

Aviation Services, Fixed Wing Operations, was audited by the International Standards Business Aviation Organization (IS-BAO) and was granted Stage I certification. IS-BAO Stage II certification is anticipated in 2023.

IS-BAO is an industry standard built for operators, by operators that provides standards based on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS).

Helicopter contractors are pursuing to be compliant with the International Standards Business Aviation Organization (IS-BAO). Compliance with international regulatory standards and industry best practices estimated in – Q4 2022.

Aviation is pursuing the development of a Flight Management System (FMS). This will improve process adherence and controls, support a new technical review process, and provide improved flight data management

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Helicopter/Flight Accident or Incident metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the Helicopter/Flight Accident or Incident metric is not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the Helicopter/Flight Accident or Incident metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: None.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric does not represent a 2020 GRC stated safety goal. This metric is a key risk indicator for the Aviation Incident risk.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 22: Percentage of Serious Injury and Fatality (SIF) Corrective Actions Completed on Time

Metric Name and Description: Percentage of Serious Injury or Fatality (SIF) Corrective Actions Completed on Time. A SIF corrective action is one that is tied to a SIF actual or potential injury or near hit.

Risks: Employee Safety Incident, Contractor Safety Incident, and Motor Vehicle Safety Incident.[93]

Category: Injuries and Near Hits

Units: Total number of SIF corrective actions completed on time (as measured by the due date accepted by LOB Corrective Action Review Boards) divided by the total number of SIF corrective actions past due or completed.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-22
SIF TIMELINESS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



93 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks Employee Safety Incident, Contractor Safety Incident, and Motor Vehicle Safety Incident.

Narrative Context: Corrective action timeliness is a key ingredient to ensuring that measures are taken to strengthen the capacity to work safe while performing high-energy job tasks by implementing effective direct controls. Between 2017 and 2019, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) had an average corrective action timeliness rate of 96-percent. In 2020, it dropped to 79-percent. The drop in 2020 can largely be attributed to the pandemic, which caused cancellations of field visits and delayed shipment of tools or materials required to complete corrective actions on time. In addition, in 2020, PG&E prohibited the extension of any corrective actions related to SIF incidents, without justification and the Chief Safety Officer's approval. In previous years, approval to extend due dates was based on the line of business action owner and their leadership. In 2021, corrective actions were completed on time 97-percent, five percentage points over the end of year target of 92-percent.

PG&E continues to monitor and review corrective actions on a weekly basis to ensure the support, tools and resources are available to complete actions on time and with quality.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes, the SIF Correction Actions Complete was used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the SIF Correction Actions Complete on Time metric is linked to 2021 group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the SIF Correction Actions Complete on Time metric is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: Yes. This metric is reviewed by PG&E Internal Audit on a quarterly basis.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric was a stated Key Safety Metric in Table 1-1 of the 2020 GRC testimony on Safety and Health.[94]

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

94 PG&E GRC Exhibit (PG&E-7), Chapter 1, Safety and Health, p. 1-19.

Metric 23: Hard Brake Rate

Metric Name and Description: Hard Brake Rate – The total number of hard braking events (greater than or equal to 8 mph per second decrease in speed) per thousand miles driven in a given period.

Risks: Motor Vehicle Safety Incident[95]

Category: Vehicle

Units: Total number of hard braking events per thousand miles driven in a given period.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-23
HARD BRAKE RATE METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E began tracking the hard brake rate metric in 2016. The hard brake rate has been in steady decline between 2016 and 2021. During the 2017-2021 time period, the number of vehicles tracking hard braking has increased from 6,500 to approximately 9,400.

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95 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Motor Vehicle Safety Incident.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Hard Brake Rate metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the Hard Brake Rate metric was not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the Hard Brake Rate metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: Data on Hard Brake Rate is provided by a third-party vendor.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: While this metric is not specifically stated in the 2020 GRC; it is part of the Safe Driving Rate metric, which also includes Hard Acceleration. For 2021, this metric is track and trend and does not have a corresponding target.[96]

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

96 PG&E GRC Exhibit (PG&E-7), Chapter 1, Safety and Health, p. 1-19.

Metric 24: Driver's Call Complaint Rate

Metric Name and Description: Driver's Call Complaint Rate – This metric measures the total number of Driver Check complaint calls received per 1 million miles driven by vehicles included in the Driver Check Program.

Risk: Motor Vehicle Safety[97]

Category: Motor Vehicle

Units: Total number of Driver Check complaint calls received per 1 million miles driven

Summary:

FIGURE 5-24
DRIVER'S CALL COMPLAINT RATE METRIC DATA (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E began tracking this metric in 2016. The driver complaint rate has dropped over 50 percent since 2016. There was a slight uptick in this metric in 2021 due to the introduction of a new report type regarding speeding events that are generated from our telematics data. For

97 The Corporate Risk Register now has the following risks: Motor Vehicle Safety Incident.

every complaint there is an e-mail to the Supervisor, which requires follow-up and coaching with the employee.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Driver's Call Complaint Rate metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the Driver's Call Complaint Rate metric is not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the Driver's Call Complaint Rate metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: Data on driver check calls is provided by a third-party vendor.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric was stated in the 2020 GRC as "Driver's Check Rate" and as track and trend only safety goal.[98] The name has since been updated to Driver's Call Complaint Rate.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

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98 PG&E GRC Exhibit (PG&E-7), Chapter 1, Safety and Health, p. 1-19.

Metric 25: Wires-Down not resulting in Automatic De-energization

Metric Name and Description: Wires-Down not resulting in Automatic De-energization – This metric is defined as the number of occurrences of wire down events in the past calendar year that did not result in automatic (i.e., not manually activated) de-energization by circuit protection devices such as fuses, circuit breakers, and reclosers, etc. on all portions of a downed conductor that rest on the ground. This metric does not consider possible energization due to induced voltages from magnetic coupling of parallel circuits. Metric excludes secondary conductors and service drops. The metric is reported as a percentage of all wires down events in the past calendar year. Separate metrics are provided for transmission and distribution systems.

Risks: Electric Overhead, wildfire

Category: Electric

Units: Percentage of wires down occurrences

Summary:

FIGURE 5-25A
DISTRIBUTION WIRES-DOWN NOT RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC DE-ENERGIZATION (ANNUAL)



FIGURE 5-25B
TRANSMISSION WIRES-DOWN NOT RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC DE-ENERGIZATION (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E updated its outage reporting tools in 2015 to allow for reporting of capturing when a distribution or transmission wire down event was noted by field personnel as being energized upon arrival and as such, 2016 was the first full year when this detail was reported in its outage data base. As can be seen in Figure 5-25A, the Distribution percentage value has ranged from 9.6% in 2017 and 15.9% in 2020 with a six-year average of 12.6%, whereas the Transmission percentage value ranged from 2.3% in 2018 and 9.9% in 2019 with a six-year average of 6.2%(Figure 5-25-B)While PG&E has not tracked this specific metric in the past. For safety reasons, field personnel generally treat wire down events an energized if unknown and these percentages above represent the information reported as actually being energized.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Wires-Down not resulting in Automatic De-energization metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for year 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the Wires-Down not resulting in Automatic De-energization metric is not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the Wires-Down not resulting in Automatic De-energization metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: The T&D Wires Down metric is a strong proxy of the overall goal of reducing the potential contacts with wires down and improving the reliability of the electric system along with reducing public safety risk. From the metric data, performance and target-setting perspective, there are several controls put in place that have been verified by Internal Audit.

– The wires down events are reported by field and control center personnel per uniform reporting guidelines as the events occur.
– Engineers conduct post wire down event reviews (typically for the non-MED events) and will initiate corrections to the data via the outage quality team to ensure the reporting guidelines were followed and the records align with information reported by repair crews.
– The outage quality team processes all valid change requests received and also initiates corrections based on their reviews and findings of the collected outage information.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: While this specific metric is not tied to a 2020 GRC Safety Goal, The T&D Wires Down metric (excluding downed secondary distribution wires and MEDs) has been one of the key indicators that PG&E is using to track Public Safety Performance.

Significant work was performed to reduce wires down, including replacing overhead conductor, vegetation clearing, hardening of distribution circuits, infrared inspections of overhead lines to identify and repair hot spots, investigating wires down incidents, and implementing learnings/corrective actions.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 26: Missed Inspections and Patrols for Electric Circuits

Metric Name and Description: Missed Inspections and Patrols for Electric Circuits – Metrics are calculated as annual number of overhead electric structures that did not comply with the inspection frequency requirements divided by total number of overhead electric structures with inspections due in the past calendar year. Separate metrics are provided for patrols, detailed inspections. Separate metrics are provided for primary distribution and transmission overhead circuits. "Minimum patrol frequency" refers to the frequency of patrols as specified in General Order (GO) 165. "Structures" refers to electric assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines, poles, etc.

Risks: Electric Overhead, wildfire

Category: Electric

Units: Percentage of structures that missed inspection relative to total required structures.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-26A
MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS (ANNUAL)
(TRANSMISSION PATROLS)



FIGURE 5-26B
MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS (ANNUAL)
(TRANSMISSION INSPECTIONS)



FIGURE 5-26C
MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS (ANNUAL)
(DISTRIBUTION PATROLS)



FIGURE 5-26D
MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS (ANNUAL)
(DISTRIBUTION INSPECTIONS)



Narrative Context:

Distribution Patrols and Inspections

Prior to year 2014, GO 165 required that patrols and inspections be completed any time between January 1 and December 31 each year.

Starting in 2015 and through 2019, we implemented the new GO 165 requirement to complete patrols and inspections each year within a prescribed timeframe, based on the date of the last patrol or inspection. Our interpretation and implementation of this new language calculated the due date for each patrol or inspection each year as follows:

The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) twelve plus three (12+3) month Patrol and Inspection requirement defines:

- The due date for each “plat map” is based on the date the map was last inspected or patrolled.
- Inspections or patrols (of the facilities on a map) may not exceed 3 additional months past the previous inspection or patrol date of that facilities on that map (maximum 15 months).
- Inspections or patrols may be performed before the due date.
- Inspections or patrols are performed by the end of the calendar year (12/31).

- The start of an inspection or a patrol starts a new inspection or patrol interval that must be completed within the prescribed timeframe.

For the years 2020 and 2021, we pivoted away from the “12+3” due date for completing patrols and inspections (of the facilities on a map), and instead directed our inspection program towards accelerating inspections for all inspectable electric facilities in the High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) to be completed in first half of year and Non-HFTD inspections for second half of year. As a result, we completed patrols and inspections by “static” due dates of 8/31 for HFTD areas, and 12/31 for Non-HFTD areas.

In 2022, PG&E intends to complete overhead patrols and inspections in compliance with GO 165.

Transmission Patrols and Inspections

Patrols involve simple visual observations to identify obvious nonconformances. All assets require either a detailed inspection or a patrol each year. While detailed inspections have shifted from circuit-based cycles to an inspection frequency that depends on HFTD and structure-level risk considerations, patrols remain circuit-based. Therefore, any line that does not receive a detailed inspection from end-to-end will require a patrol and it is possible for some structures to receive both an inspection and a patrol in the same year. Patrols may be performed either by air (helicopter) or ground (walking or driving).

The overhead transmission detailed inspection program has undergone significant evolution over the reporting period for the metric. Prior to 2019, detailed ground inspections were performed by circuit with a frequency depending on the voltage and whether the majority of the structures on the circuit were wood (2-year cycle) or steel (5-year cycle). The Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP), which began in late 2018 and extended into 2019, introduced several key improvements to overhead transmission inspections: the use of an 'enhanced' inspection methodology with a questionnaire developed from a wildfire-ignition Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and the addition of aerial inspections using high-resolution drone photographs to provide a second vantage point from above to complement the ground inspections performed with the inspector standing at the base of the structure. These improvements from

WSIP were incorporated into the regular overhead inspection program beginning in 2020. The 2020 inspections replaced the old wood- or steel-based inspection cycles with cycles that called for more frequent inspections in HFTD, annually for Tier 3 and on a 3-year cycle for Tier 2, compared to a 5-year cycle for non-HFTD. The 2020 inspections also included non-HFTD structures in PG&E-designated High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA), which were treated like Tier 2. The inspection program in 2021 continued using the HFTD-based cycles introduced in 2020 and imposed an in-year deadline for HFTD and HFRA inspections of 7/31, which PG&E committed to in the 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). The intent of this deadline was to allow completion of the inspections and any emergency repairs found from the inspections prior to peak fire season. Monthly validations of the inspection plan were started in June 2021 to ensure that all assets requiring an inspection under their prescribed cycles were included in the plan, including assets that were newly added to the asset registry. The 2022 inspection scope introduced the use of wildfire risk and consequence scores at the structure level to inform the selection of assets to be inspected.

Data provided for 2015-2019 reflects systemwide performance. HFTD-specific performance is not available prior to 2020. The HFTD data for patrols and inspections was tracked in SAP starting in 2020.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Missed Inspections and Patrols for Electric Circuits metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Missed Inspections and Patrols for Electric Circuits metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Missed Inspections and Patrols for Electric Circuits metric:

- **Director:** Electric Operations (6);
- **Senior Director:** Electric Operations (1); and
- **Vice President:** Electric Operations (1).

Bias Controls: Tracking spreadsheet at the division level for each of the 18 distribution compliance offices, with all maintenance plans that are due for the year – including the following:

- Patrols: Date of last patrol, with calculated CPUC due date;
- Inspections: Date of last inspection, with calculated CPUC due date;
- As work is completed, entries are made into the spreadsheet including the date that the work was started and completed, Inspector Name and LAN ID, etc.; and
- Tracking column indicating if the work was completed <= the CPUC due date.

Division spreadsheets are merged into a master file every week, with the following tracking mechanisms:

- "At Risk" report, which provides the work that is coming due in the next 2 weeks & 6 weeks, for visibility;
- Summary report, by Division, showing volume of facilities that were completed on time or late;
- Recurring calls with Area Managers and Supervisor, to review the "At Risk" report to ensure visibility of upcoming due dates, understanding of any late units; and
- For late units, centralized tracking of all late units within the System Inspections "data response" team, including reason for work being complete late, remediation efforts needed, etc.

Supervisors have visibility in to CPUC due dates, are required to dispatch work to Inspectors in time to meet dates. Inspectors see CPUC due dates on paper map package and in the Inspect application, so that they can prioritize and ensure they complete the work by the due date. Due date requirements are

covered during Inspector training courses. Contract resources have visibility into due dates, expectation is that they complete all assigned work by due dates.

"Engage" application – scheduling tool for Supervisor to assign OH inspections, includes the due date for each maintenance plan, so that supervisors have visibility and can ensure they are dispatching work in time to meet the CPUC due date. Daily "Attainment Report" for OH inspections completed in the Inspect application, which includes "asset required date" (CPUC due date and/or WMP date, whichever date is sooner) and completion date.

Various monthly reporting and metrics showing volume of patrols and inspections completed on time or late.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: The Missed Inspections and Patrols metric is related to PG&E's commitment to perform its Detailed Electric Distribution and Transmission Inspections in Compliance with its WMP, but also with GO 165. Significant work was performed to ensure electric facilities were inspected within their respective compliance timelines, but to ensure the inspections were effective in identifying non-conformances that required urgent repairs to mitigation for the potential of catastrophic wildfires. Furthermore, additional planning controls were developed to ensure all inspectable facilities are in a planned inspection cycle to avoid inspections being missed.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 27: Overhead Conductor Size in High Fire Threat District, Tiers 2 and 3, (HFTD)

Metric Name and Description: Overhead Conductor Size in High Fire Threat District, Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD – Percentage of primary distribution overhead conductors in Tiers 2 and 3 HFTD that is #6 copper (6Cu). Secondary conductors are excluded.

Risks: Electric Overhead, wildfire

Category: Electric

Units: Percentage relative to total circuit miles.

Summary:

FIGURE 5-27
OVERHEAD CONDUCTOR SIZE IN HIGH FIRE THREAT DISTRICT, TIERS 2 AND 3, (HFTD) (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E's system of record for our electric distribution facilities is Electric Distribution Geographic Information System (EDGIS). The EDGIS data points above show a reduction of 6 CU over time within PG&E's distribution system. PG&E has eliminated the use of 6Cu in new construction, however it is still used in cases of maintenance and emergency work.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Overhead Conductor Size in High Fire Threat District, Tiers 2 and 3, (HFTD) metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the Overhead Conductor Size in High Fire Threat District, Tiers 2 and 3, (HFTD) metric is not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the Overhead Conductor Size in High Fire Threat District, Tiers 2 and 3, (HFTD) metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: As this is a new measure for PG&E, there are currently no bias controls in place for measuring the amount of 6Cu in our system. As of January 2022, there are a total of 25,278.5 Distribution overhead circuit miles located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD areas. PG&E's data bases reflect the circuit miles that currently exist and do not maintain the historical values specifically in the Tier 2/3 areas. As such, PG&E has assumed these values have remained the same for all years from 2013 to 2021 and assuming annual variances due to the circuit miles are very small.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: PG&E does not focus on this metric; therefore, it is not used to track safety performance. There is no safety goal associated with the amount of 6Cu in the 2020 GRC.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report. This is a new metric for PG&E to track, and EDGIS system capabilities only have annual data snapshots as far back as 2017 and we currently do not have the ability to display the results in a monthly manner.

Metric 28: Gas Operation Corrective Actions Backlog

Metric Name and Description: Gas Operation (GO) Corrective Actions Backlog - Total number of overdue work orders generated to correct 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192 non-compliances or infractions Notices of Violation that exceeded the maximum allowable/allotted time frame to complete the work order in the past calendar year divided by the total number of closed or still-open non-compliance or infraction Notices of Violation-related work orders in past calendar year, evaluated at the end of the year. Maximum allowable/allotted time is based on either applicable requirement in 49 CFR Part192, or the utility's internal standards. Separate metrics are provided for gas distribution and gas transmission (GT).

Risks: Gas safety

Category: Gas

Units: Percentage of work orders past due for completion in the past calendar year

Summary:

FIGURE 5-28A
GAS OPERATION CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BACKLOG (DISTRIBUTION) (ANNUAL)



FIGURE 5-28B
GAS OPERATION CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BACKLOG (TRANSMISSION) (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context:

This metric measure overdue corrective work orders (leveraging timeframes outlined in 49 CFR Part 192) as a percentage of total corrective workorders in a given calendar year. PG&E includes actions resulting from low cathodic protection reads and atmospheric corrosion remediation of bad coating or wrap at the air to soil interface in the calculation of this metric.

In 2021, GO Corrective Action Backlog was 0.02 for Gas Distribution. From 2012-2021, there has been a 50 percent decrease in GO Corrective Backlog. In 2021, GO Corrective Action Backlog for GT was 0.03 for GT which is a significant increase compared to the data for the historical years.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the GO Corrective Actions Backlog metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the GO Corrective Actions Backlog metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the GO Corrective Actions Backlog metric:

- **Director:** Gas Engineering (1), GO (1).

Bias Controls: Work orders are generated in our system of record and assigned due dates per guidance in 49 CFR Part 192. Overdue items are tracked by our compliance team and issued via a "self-report" to the CPUC. The data is tracked through monthly attainment reporting for different asset types.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a stated safety goal in the 2020 GRC.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 29: GO-95 Corrective Actions (Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD)

Metric Name and Description: General Order (GO)-95 Corrective Actions (Tiers 2 and 3, High Fire Threat District (HFTD)) – The number of Priority Level 2 notifications that were completed on time divided by the total number of Priority Level 2 notifications that were due in the calendar year in Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD. Consistent with GO 95 Rule 18 provisions, the proposed metric should exclude notifications that qualify for extensions under reasonable circumstances. Separate metrics are provided for distribution and transmission systems.

Risks: Electric safety and wildfire

Category: Electric

Units: Percentage of corrective actions completed

Summary:

FIGURE 5-29
GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (TIERS 2 AND 3, HFTD) (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: The GO 95 Corrective Actions in HFTD metric measures the number of Priority Level 2 corrective notifications (tags) in HFTD that are completed in accordance with the GO 95 Rule 18 timelines.

This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Asset Risk and our Wildfire Risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report filing. Vegetation Management (VM) work

generally follows wildfire risk priorities. Priority notifications are tracked to completion against procedural timelines that are consistent with the underlying risk of the work.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the GO-95 Corrective Actions (Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD) metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the GO-95 Corrective Actions (Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD) metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the GO-95 Corrective Actions (Tiers 2 and 3, HFTD) metric:

- **Director:** Electric Operations (2), Supply Chain (4);
- **Senior Director:** Electric Operations (2), Supply Chain (2); and
- **Vice President:** Electric Operations (1).

Bias Controls:

- **Transmission:** Once a notification is released to LC, the Centralized Inspection Review Team (CIRT) is the only group that can edit the priority, fire tier, scope of work (via Facility Damage Action (FDA)/ Work Type Code (WTC)), due date, and other fields. That is controlled by adding the user status code, PRTO status, which severely limits the editable fields to anyone outside of CIRT. CIRT adds this status to all notifications that are reviewed.
- **Distribution:** Once a notification is entered into SAP it is released for review in the gatekeeper screen which has SAP controls build into it base on the FDA table that has the various FDAs (facility/damage/action), WTC (work type codes), tag priority, duration/due date, etc. The tags info (pictures, map, comments) are reviewed by the gatekeepers that make up CIRT and confirmed as EC. Once a tag is converted to an EC, edit functions to certain fields are limited to the compliance group.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This metric is not a 2020 GRC stated safety goal. PG&E has focused its GO95 Corrective Actions in HFTDs with a risk-informed prioritization of its work plans. PG&E's strategy focuses on reducing wildfire risk associated with open corrective notifications while deploying safety controls to manage the lower risk Level 2 Priority "E" corrective notifications. This approach allows strategic and targeted wildfire risk reductions to continue to be our primary focus.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 30: Gas Overpressure Events

Metric Name and Description: Gas Overpressure Events - CPUC-reportable overpressure events are those that met the conditions specified in General Order 112-F, 122.2(d)(5) but are reported on the same frequency as the other Safety Performance Metrics. Separate metrics are provided for distribution and transmission systems. This metric measures both gas operational performance and the integrity of gas pipelines.

Risks: Large Overpressure Event Downstream of Gas Measurement and Control Facility; Loss of Containment at Gas Measurement and Control or Compression and Processing Facility

Category: Gas

Units: Number of occurrences

Summary:

FIGURE 5-30
GAS OVERPRESSURE EVENTS (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: A large Overpressure event is defined as any verified pressure reading that exceeds the design limits set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) – 49 CFR 192.201. This metric tracks the occurrence of Overpressure events, which includes:

1. High pressure gas distribution
    a. (Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) 1 pound per square inch gauge (psig) to 12 psig) greater than 50 percent above MAOP
    b. (MAOP 12 psig to 60 psig) greater than 6 psig
2. Transmission pipelines greater than 10 percent above MAOP (or the pressure produces a hoop stress of ≥75 percent Specified Minimum Yield Strength, whichever is lower)

Overpressure events on low pressure systems are excluded from this metric because they are not defined in federal code 49 CFR 192.201. From 2011-2021, the number of Gas Overpressure events has been considerably reduced by 72 percent with just five occurrences in 2021. PG&E attributes this reduction in Overpressure events to implementation of station design and construction best practices to mitigate common failure mode through installation of secondary over pressure protection devices on pilot operated regulation equipment.

PG&E has identified human performance and equipment failure as the two most common causes for Overpressure events. Actions to eliminate Overpressure events were implemented, including station design and construction best practices; lock-out/tag-out process improvements; and distribution of information around associated Overpressure risk factors through training and communication initiatives. PG&E installed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) points to increase system real-time visibility in the Gas Control Center which could provide better detection capabilities and allow more Overpressure events to be identified and recorded. PG&E also installed sulfur filters on pilot-operated equipment. Large Volume Customer primary regulation sets also received accelerated inspections.

PG&E continues to review operations and look for opportunities to perform work to further limit potential MAOP exceedances. Each activity builds on the

goal to eliminate large Overpressure events, thereby contributing to system safety and reliability.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

Yes. The Gas Overpressure Events metric is a component of the Large Overpressure Events Rate which was used as a STIP metric for 2021. Large Overpressure Events Rate tracks the number of large overpressure events per 100 SCADA visibility points on the gas system.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas Overpressure Events metric is linked to 2021 group performance goals for one or more Director-level position or higher.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, the Gas Overpressure Events metric is linked to all individual goals as part of 2021 STIP plan. In addition, this metric may be included as part of an individual's performance goals.

Bias Controls: PG&E has both an automated process and field process for logging Gas Overpressure events. For the automated process, SCADA system monitors equipment pressure and notifies potential issues to Gas Control through alarms. For the field process, field personnel are required to gauge pressure during maintenance and clearances, and report to Gas Control if an abnormal operating condition arises.

Several controls, verified by Internal Auditing, are in place for this metric:

1. Each Overpressure event is entered into our SAP Corrective Action Program (CAP) system of record to ensure retention of record history.
2. Each Overpressure event's datasets (location, CAP number, date, cause, corrective action etc.) are reviewed by the Facility Integrity Management Program team to ensure accuracy and are logged in the Overpressure master list which is viewable by all PG&E employees.
3. Each Overpressure event is distributed to stakeholders by an electronic page (epage) and an email (Quick Hit), which is reviewed in the next Daily Operations Briefing with leadership.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: Overall: PG&E's strategic objectives include plans to execute the secondary Overpressure Protection program to mitigate common failure mode failure overpressure events for both Gas Transmission (GT) and Gas Distribution (GD) over a 10-year period (2018-2027)—with the expectation that 50 percent of the pilot operated GD regulator stations and GT Large Volume Customer Regulators (LVCR) will be addressed by the end of 2022.

Distribution: For the 2019-2022 rate case period, PG&E plans to retrofit 50 percent of distribution pilot operated stations by 2022.

Transmission: In 2019, we began rebuilding and retrofitting LVCRs sets specifically to address Overpressure risks. All LVCRs are forecasted to be rebuilt or retrofitted by the end of 2023.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 31: Gas In-Line Inspections Missed

Metric Name and Description: The number of gas pipeline in-line inspections that missed the required reassessment interval, according to the relevant intervals established pursuant to 49 CFR, Part 192.

Risks: Catastrophic Damage Involving High-Pressure Pipeline Failure

Category: Gas

Units: Number of Missed Inspections

Summary:

TABLE 5-31
GAS IN-LINE INSPECTIONS MISSED



Narrative Context: From 2012–2020, there has been no instances of gas pipeline in-line inspections that missed the required reassessment interval, according to the relevant intervals established pursuant to 49 CFR, Part 192. However, in 2021 PG&E recorded 1 instance of gas pipeline in-line inspection that missed the required reassessment interval. This missed inspection was due to potential reliability impacts of the inspection.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Gas In-Line Inspections Missed metric was not used as a STIP metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

Yes, the Gas In-Line Inspections Missed metric is linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for one or more Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

Yes, in 2021, the following position(s) include individual performance goals that are linked to the Gas In-Line Inspections Missed metric:

- **Director:** Gas Engineering (1);
- **Senior Director:** Gas Engineering (1); and
- **Senior Vice President:** Gas Engineering (1).

Bias Controls: Metric results are reported as needed when a non-conformance occurs. This is reviewed by Regulatory Compliance Department at weekly Self Report Meetings.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This safety metric does not support a 2020 GRC safety goal given this metric is a gas transmission, not distribution, related metric. Non-compliance for missed ILI inspections are not specifically tracked as part of any Rate Case as it is mandatory federal safety requirement PG&E is committed to meeting.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

Metric 32: Overhead Conductor Safety Index

Metric Name and Description: Overhead Conductor Safety Index - Overhead Conductor Safety Index is the sum of all annual occurrences on overhead transmission or primary voltage distribution conductors satisfying one or more of the following conditions divided by total circuit miles in the system x 1,000:

1) A conductor or splice becomes physically broken;
2) A conductor is dislodged from its intended design position due to either malfunction of its attachment points and/or supporting structures or contact with foreign objects (including vegetation);
3) A conductor falls from its intended position to rest on the ground or a foreign object;
4 A conductor comes into contact with communication circuits, guy wires, or conductors of a lower voltage; or
5) A power pole carrying normally energized conductors leans by more than 45 degrees in any direction relative to the vertical reference when measured at ground level.

Separate metrics are reported for transmission and primary voltage distribution conductors. Secondary voltage conductors and service drops are not included in this metric.

Risks: Wildfire, Transmission Overhead Conductor, Distribution Overhead Conductor Primary

Category: Electric

Units: Number of occurrences per circuit mile

Summary:

FIGURE 5-32
OVERHEAD CONDUCTOR SAFETY INDEX (ANNUAL)



Narrative Context: PG&E does not currently does not have the ability report out on this metric per the five subcomponents listed above, as we do not track conductor failures at that level of granularity. We have assumed that the spirit of this metric aligns with our Wires Down metric definition as stated in Metrics 1 and 2 and the numbers above represent the number of Distribution and Transmission Wire Down Events divided by total overhead circuit miles.

Is Metric Used for the Purposes of Determining Executive (Director Level or Higher) Compensation Levels and/or Incentives?

No, the Overhead Conductor Safety Index metric was not used as a Short-Term Incentive Plan metric for 2021.

Is Metric Linked to the Determination of Individual or Group Performance Goals?

No, the Overhead Conductor Safety Index metric is not linked to 2021 individual or group performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions.

Is Metric Linked to Executive (Director Level or Higher) Positions?

No, the Overhead Conductor Safety Index metric is not linked to individual performance goals for Director-level, or higher, positions in 2021.

Bias Controls: The T&D Wires Down metric is a strong proxy of the overall goal of reducing the potential contacts with wires down and improving the reliability of the electric system along with reducing public safety risk. From the metric data, performance, and target-setting perspective, there are several controls put in place that have been verified by Internal Audit.

– The wires down events are reported by field and control center personnel per uniform reporting guidelines as the events occur.
– Engineers conduct post wire down event reviews (typically for the non-MED events) and will initiate corrections to the data via the outage quality team to ensure the reporting guidelines were followed and the records align with information reported by repair crews.
– The outage quality team processes all valid change requests received and also initiates corrections based on their reviews and findings of the collected outage information.

Rate Case Safety Goal Progress: This specific metric is not tied to a 2020 GRC or RAMP Safety goal, however the T&D Wires Down metric (excluding downed secondary distribution wires and MEDs, please refer to Metric 1) has been one of the key indicators that PG&E is using to track Public Safety Performance.

Significant work was performed to reduce wires down, including replacing overhead conductor, vegetation clearing, hardening of distribution circuits, infrared inspections of overhead lines to identify and repair hot spots, investigating wires down incidents, and implementing learnings/corrective actions.

Monthly Data: See Attachment A at the end of this report.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

ATTACHMENT A

MONTHLY METRIC DATA TABLES

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 1

TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION (T&D) OVERHEAD WIRES DOWN - NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS

2012 - 2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	233	191	427	247	176	231	206	200	146	203	395	377	3,032
2	2013	163	179	192	225	225	209	176	207	203	237	160	219	2,395
3	2014	168	302	246	193	178	181	194	189	163	221	182	399	2,616
4	2015	158	237	143	185	154	198	184	225	189	219	274	410	2,576
5	2016	430	184	511	270	225	211	224	178	213	343	219	292	3,300
6	2017	283	376	378	242	263	238	233	215	230	205	246	158	3,067
7	2018	216	175	370	231	210	231	272	204	168	213	208	287	2,785
8	2019	335	249	336	238	311	206	198	210	216	138	232	341	3,010
9	2020	159	172	245	229	235	213	196	240	192	180	237	196	2,494
10	2021	262	188	292	174	217	238	213	181	208	255	248	265	2,741

(a) PG&E has utilized its Integrated Logging Information System-Operations Data Base (ILIS-ODB) to provide the number of distribution outages that involved distribution wire down event conditions.

(b) Distribution wire down conditions during PSPS events are not included in these totals since these typically occur when the lines are de-energized and are generally not the initiating cause of the reported outage event.

(c) PG&E's current definition for distribution wire down events are only related to sustained outages of its primary distribution system reported in its ILIS-ODB data base.

(d) Transmission wire down events were not tracked until 2012 and 2013 was the first year distribution wire down events were uniformly tracked.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 2

TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION (T&D) OVERHEAD WIRES DOWN - MAJOR EVENT DAYS

2012 - 2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	233	191	427	247	176	231	206	200	146	203	395	753	3,408
2	2013	163	179	192	312	225	217	176	207	203	237	362	219	2,692
3	2014	168	302	246	193	178	181	194	216	163	221	182	1,147	3,391
4	2015	158	714	143	189	154	211	216	225	189	225	274	581	3,279
5	2016	430	274	714	270	225	211	224	178	213	397	219	292	3,647
6	2017	1,947	1,402	378	468	263	253	233	215	325	488	246	257	6,475
7	2018	216	175	431	231	215	231	283	204	168	219	334	287	2,994
8	2019	880	1,786	336	238	311	229	198	219	232	283	524	341	5,577
9	2020	264	393	516	229	235	213	196	375	233	206	237	196	3,293
10	2021	1,473	188	292	174	217	238	224	222	224	775	248	1,547	5,822

(a) PG&E has utilized its Integrated Logging Information System-Operations Data Base (ILIS-ODB) to provide the number of distribution outages that involved distribution wire down event conditions.

(b) Distribution wire down conditions during PSPS events are not included in these totals since these typically occur when the lines are de-energized and are generally not the initiating cause of the reported outage event.

(c) PG&E's current definition for distribution wire down events are only related to sustained outages of its primary distribution system reported in its ILIS-ODB data base.

(d) Transmission wire down events were not tracked until 2012 and 2013 was the first year distribution wire down events were uniformly tracked.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 3

ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME

"Average and median time in minutes to respond on-site"

2012-2021

Line No.	Year		January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	avg													82
		med													33
2	2013	avg													35
		med													31
3	2014	avg													35
		med													31
4	2015	avg	39	65	32	34	33	42	41	37	34	43	37	33	39
		med	29	34	28	28	28	27	28	30	27	28	26	27	28
5	2016	avg	39	32	32	43	35	39	33	39	33	37	33	46	37
		med	27	26	27	28	26	28	28	28	28	27	29	28	28
6	2017	avg	42	46	40	46	41	35	33	33	40	32	31	40	40
		med	31	33	28	31	28	27	30	28	28	29	27	28	30
7	2018	avg	27	30	35	41	41	38	39	39	35	36	37	36	36
		med	25	27	26	28	28	27	29	27	28	28	28	30	28
8	2019	avg	31	46	31	37	33	35	25	31	31	32	37	32	41
		med	29	32	29	30	29	31	29	30	30	31	32	30	30
9	2020	avg	31	39	30	30	29	29	30	33	30	30	30	30	31
		med	29	31	29	29	28	27	30	30	31	29	29	29	29
10	2021	avg	36	30	30	29	29	29	29	31	30	35	32	34	32
		med	32	29	29	27	29	28	29	30	30	32	31	30	30

(a) PG&E began tracking monthly data in 2015

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 4
FIRE IGNITIONS
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014	1	1		2	3	51	74	40	36	41	18	12	279
4	2015	4	13	13	24	38	97	80	73	64	42	15	11	474
5	2016	2	5	1	26	38	84	71	67	60	38	7		399
6	2017	9	3	7	19	44	101	112	81	70	106	23	20	595
7	2018	7	8	6	11	38	107	93	72	56	36	30	3	467
8	2019	5	5	3	17	41	84	73	64	69	84	35	6	486
9	2020	1	16	11	17	52	106	66	86	55	61	29	16	516
10	2021	43	12	18	33	74	92	64	47	33	49	9	5	477

(a) Metric includes all powerline-involved fire incidents annually reportable to the CPUC per Decision 14-02-015 and within the entire PG&E service territory (not just HFTD). A reportable fire incident includes all of the following: 1) Ignition is associated with PG&E powerlines and 2) something other than PG&E facilities burned and 3) the resulting fire traveled more than one meter from the ignition point.

(b) PG&E began tracking this metric in July 2014. The full year of metric data is only availble for 2015-2020.

(c) The 2015-2020 2019 fire ignition metric data reflects fire ignitions previously not included in the 2019 Safety Performance Metrics Report due to a misidentification in a field-based documentation system. PG&E is currently conducting an audit of the datasets that may contain fire ignition data.

(d) PG&E has included the Zogg Fire in this ignition count because CAL FIRE has announced that the cause of the Zogg Fire was a pine tree contacting PG&E overhead electric lines. PG&E's investigation into the cause of the Zogg Fire is ongoing.

(e) PG&E has included 7 ignitions in 2021 that meet Electric Incident Report criteria, defined by Appendix B to CPUC D.06-04-055. PG&E has not formed a conclusion about the origin or cause of these particular ignitions.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS
TABLE 5
GAS DIG-INS
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	UOM	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012														
2	2012														
3	2012														
4	2013														
5	2013														
6	2013														
7	2014	Gas Tickets													671313
8	2014	3rd Party Dig-ins													1621
9	2014	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio													2.41
10	2015	Gas Tickets													788901
11	2015	3rd Party Dig-ins													1694
12	2015	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio													2.15
13	2016	Gas Tickets	60154	68599	73839	69660	74564	76594	70610	84300	78050	73127	68549	60926	858972
14	2016	3rd Party Dig-ins	84	115	114	147	149	179	167	211	190	142	145	91	1734
15	2016	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio	1.4	1.68	1.54	2.11	2	2.34	2.37	2.5	2.43	1.94	2.12	1.49	2.02
16	2017	Gas Tickets	62163	61145	82191	73287	85823	84379	77764	90450	81709	89552	80815	73387	942665
17	2017	3rd Party Dig-ins	65	79	155	128	175	181	192	205	162	172	129	137	1780
18	2017	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio	1.05	1.29	1.89	1.75	2.04	2.15	2.47	2.27	1.98	1.92	1.6	1.87	1.89
19	2018	Gas Tickets	82986	77901	84149	89657	95567	91232	94206	104059	87105	101917	85994	74937	1069710
20	2018	3rd Party Dig-ins	93	127	96	137	195	160	179	174	159	164	131	103	1718
21	2018	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio	1.12	1.63	1.14	1.53	2.04	1.75	1.9	1.67	1.83	1.61	1.52	1.37	1.61
22	2019	Gas Tickets	90140	93011	122101	130536	128393	122987	145646	157091	155556	165328	129355	115970	1556114
23	2019	3rd Party Dig-ins	83	76	98	132	135	161	188	193	156	178	137	82	1619
24	2019	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio	0.92	0.82	0.8	1.01	1.05	1.31	1.29	1.23	1	1.08	1.06	0.71	1.04
25	2020	Gas Tickets	132997	130127	124530	119393	126695	142897	140577	134692	141309	136592	102979	102140	1534928
26	2020	3rd Party Dig-ins	88	111	96	114	123	153	188	175	169	148	119	120	1604
27	2020	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio	0.66	0.85	0.77	0.95	0.97	1.07	1.34	1.3	1.2	1.08	1.16	1.17	1.05
28	2021	Gas Tickets	104556	129518	165637	167973	156393	162111	150562	162597	128307	119879	119327	106685	1673545
29	2021	3rd Party Dig-ins	114	104	118	143	134	169	150	163	151	130	97	58	1531
30	2021	3rd Party Dig-in Ratio	1.09	0.80	0.71	0.85	0.86	1.04	1.00	1.00	1.18	1.08	0.81	0.54	0.91

(a) PG&E has data available as of 2014

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 6
GAS IN-LINE INSPECTION
2012-2021
"Miles Inspected"

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY	Current System Total (Transmission)	% of Transmission Lines Inspected Annually
1	2012													175.6	5751	3%
2	2013													257.3	5737	4%
3	2014		52.1	20.3	17.9	11.9	6.4	66.8		6.9	96.3		142.8	421.3	5733	7%
4	2015			133.3				23.0	60.2	43.8		5.1		265.4	6541	4%
5	2016	3.0	7.1	0.8	15.9	29.0	12.8	57.5	8.6	7.7	114.6	1.9	0.6	259.5	6530	4%
6	2017	0.7	21.3			33.4	73.4	9.1	28.0	27.3		55.4	60.2	308.8	6535	5%
7	2018	43.2	22.4	7.4	36.9	42.9	0.6	1.3	18.3	6.0	75.2	43.2		297.4	6531	5%
8	2019		22.5	39.9	44.8	88.7	54.1	13.7	121.8	17.1	12.8	53.3	9.3	478.0[(b)]	6498	7%
9	2020	0.4	0.0	29.0	62.7	67.3	120.9	17.1	25.7	1.3	8.9	22.4	4.0	359.6	6551	5%
10	2021		94.9	91.6	0.1	73.0	160.5	108.8	152.5	137.7	0.1	74.6	76.7	970.5	6417	15%

(a) Includes miles inspected for PSEP and base reliability work

(b) Prior year report incorrectly reported 2019 results; for EOY 2019 there were a total of 478.0 miles in-line inspected.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 7
GAS IN-LINE UPGRADE
2012-2021
"Miles Upgraded"

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012		15.8						7.3			79.6		102.7
2	2013							67.0		20.0	68.7		6.5	162.2
3	2014	6.7		21.9		32.9					4.0	6.4		71.9
4	2015					6.3		12.2		11.2	5.8	11.3	25.3	72.1
5	2016	1.5				44.3	21.7	11.9		4.8	10.5	12.4		107.2
6	2017						54.2				53.4	22.4	24.4	154.4
7	2018							13.1			97.9	63.2	68.7	243.0
8	2019			36.3	62.8	2.6		3.1		70.7	10.7		59.6	245.7
9	2020			44.0	43.6	47.2	55.9	85.9			48.8	95.5	43.3	464.2
10	2021				26.7	65.9	21.9	6.6		14.5			10.0	145.6

(a) Includes miles upgraded in both PSEP and base reliability programs.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 8

SHUT IN THE GAS MEDIAN TIME - MAINS

2012-2021

"Median Number of Minutes"

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY (Median)	EOY (Avg)
1	2012														
2	2013														
3	2014													97.0	120.77
4	2015													87.0	102.8
5	2016													87.0	104.43
6	2017													89.0	103.78
7	2018													73.0	88.77
8	2019													73.7	85.13
9	2020													77.1	93.72
10	2021													73.3	102.57

(a) Monthly data not available due to various tools/databases utilized to measure SITG since 2012. 2012 + 2013 raw data not available to recalculate EOY values from Average to Median.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 9

SHUT IN THE GAS AVERAGE TIME - SERVICES

2012-2021

"Median Number of Minutes"

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY (Avg)	EOY (Median)
1	2012													70	
2	2013													61	
3	2014													52.2	38
4	2015													49	40
5	2016													45.76	37
6	2017													45.16	36
7	2018													43.3	34.6
8	2019													41.4	33.6
9	2020													41.9	33
10	2021													43.53	32.3

(a) Year end data has been provided from 2012 through 2021. Monthly data is not available due to various tools utilized to manage daily dispatch time that have since been retired. 2012 + 2013 raw data not available to recalculate EOY values from Average to Median.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 10

CROSS BORE INTRUSIONS

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	Unit Type	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	Inspections Complete													
2	2012	Cross Bores Found													
3	2012	Find Rate													
4	2013	Inspections Complete													19,500
5	2013	Cross Bores Found													151
6	2013	Find Rate													7.74
7	2014	Inspections Complete													33,570
8	2014	Cross Bores Found													193
9	2014	Find Rate													5.72
10	2015	Inspections Complete													23,531
11	2015	Cross Bores Found													104
12	2015	Find Rate													4.42
13	2016	Inspections Complete	707	520	1467	1023	901	748	2064	1874	5276	2233	4494	2346	23,653
14	2016	Cross Bores Found	4	1	7	6	7	9	11	11	7	11	8	8	90
15	2016	Find Rate	5.657709	1.923077	4.771643	5.865103	7.769145	12.03209	5.329457	5.869797	1.3267627	4.926108	1.7801513	3.4100597	3.81
16	2017	Inspections Complete	509	1000	1438	1923	2031	1936	653	3023	4707	5481	6291	6168	35,160
17	2017	Cross Bores Found	1	5	15	4	5	1	2	1	1	3	0	0	38
18	2017	Find Rate	1.96	3.98	7.13	5.13	4.35	3.51	3.48	2.72	2.03	1.67	1.31	1.08	1.08
19	2018	Inspections Complete	3232	3215	2166	4419	3568	4407	4463	5613	4851	2701	3844	3569	46,048
20	2018	Cross Bores Found	2	5	4	4	6	2	3	4	1	6	1	7	45
21	2018	Find Rate	0.62	1.09	1.28	1.15	1.27	1.09	1.02	0.97	0.86	0.96	0.89	0.98	0.98
22	2019	Inspections Complete	1739	1647	4365	2086	2816	9120	3480	6103	3035	3780	3880	1374	43,425
23	2019	Cross Bores Found	5	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	3	2	2	2	40
24	2019	Find Rate	0.62	1.09	1.28	1.15	1.27	1.09	1.02	0.97	0.86	0.96	0.89	0.98	0.98
25	2020	Inspections Complete	1788	1211	493	1435	1295	3052	681	1743	396	1720	622	2229	16665
26	2020	Cross Bores Found	5	3	7	10	4	1	7	3	4	3	6	3	56
27	2020	Find Rate	2.80	2.67	4.30	5.07	4.66	3.23	3.72	3.42	3.64	3.40	3.67	3.36	3.36
28	2021	Inspections Complete	1317	1389	1954	2300	1583	1629	2413	2593	3945	3278	3512	2380	28293
29	2021	Cross Bores Found	0	1	9	2	0	2	2	3	3	0	0	1	23
30	2021	Find Rate	0.00	0.37	2.15	1.72	1.40	1.38	1.27	1.25	1.15	0.98	0.85	0.81	0.81

(a)PG&E did not track this metric before 2013.

(b)From 2013-2015,the Cross-Bore Inspection Program was executed by an external contractor. Monthly data is not currently available.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 11A

GAS EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME

2012-2021

MEDIAN MINUTES

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY (Median)
1														
2	2013	21.0	19.6	19.6	19.4	19.8	20.0	19.9	20.3	20.4	18.3	18.0	18.0	19.4
3	2014	18.1	18.3	18.3	17.8	18.0	17.8	17.4	17.8	18.2	18.4	18.4	18.0	18.1
4	2015	18.0	18.1	18.2	18.3	18.4	18.7	18.8	19.2	18.9	18.5	18.5	18.2	18.5
5	2016	18.8	18.5	18.4	18.4	18.2	18.1	18.1	18.2	18.0	18.0	15.2	18.3	18.3
6	2017	18.4	18.2	18.1	18.2	18.4	18.8	19.5	19.0	18.8	19.2	15.4	19.1	18.7
7	2018	18.8	18.6	18.5	18.8	18.7	18.8	18.9	19.3	19.3	19.1	18.7	18.5	18.8
8	2019	18.7	19.1	18.9	18.4	18.4	19.0	19.0	19.0	19.3	19.4	19.3	18.9	18.9
9	2020	19.0	19.1	17.8	17.7	18.5	19.1	19.2	19.1	18.7	18.9	19.1	18.8	18.8
10	2021	19.0	19.0	18.9	18.8	18.9	18.7	18.7	18.7	18.8	18.8	19.0	18.8	18.8

TABLE 11B

GAS EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME

2012-2021

AVERAGES

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													26.0
2	2013	23.0	21.0	21.0	21.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	21.3
3	2014	19.9	20.3	20.0	19.7	19.9	19.6	19.4	19.7	20.2	20.2	20.4	19.7	20.0
4	2015	19.7	19.8	20.1	20.1	20.5	20.7	20.8	21.0	20.7	20.4	20.4	19.9	20.3
5	2016	20.6	20.2	20.1	20.2	19.8	19.9	19.8	19.7	20.0	19.6	19.9	20.0	20.0
6	2017	20.2	19.9	19.7	19.8	20.0	20.5	21.1	20.8	21.1	20.9	20.8	21.0	20.4
7	2018	20.5	20.5	20.3	20.5	20.4	20.5	20.8	21.2	21.3	21.0	20.4	20.4	20.6
8	2019	20.6	21.0	20.7	20.0	20.1	20.8	20.9	20.8	21.2	21.2	21.3	20.8	20.8
9	2020	20.9	20.9	19.5	19.4	20.0	20.7	20.8	20.9	20.3	20.4	21.5	20.5	20.5
10	2021	20.8	20.7	20.7	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.5	20.5	20.5	20.6	20.6	20.6

(a) PG&E did not track this metric on a monthly basis until 2013

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 12
NATURAL GAS STORAGE BASELINE INSPECTIONS PERFORMED
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY Well Baseline Inspections	EOY % Progress to Goal[b]
1	2012														
2	2013				1	1	2	1	1					6	6%
3	2014								2	3	1			6	11%
4	2015						2	1	2	1				6	17%
5	2016					1	1		2	3		1	1	9	25%
6	2017							1	1	2	2	1		7	31%
7	2018				3	2	4	1	2	1				13	43%
8	2019			1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2		14	56%
9	2020				3	3	5	3	4	2				20	74%
10	2021			1	1	4	5	5				1		17	90%

(a) PG&E did not track this metric before 2013

(b) PG&E has a goal to complete baseline well production casing assessments on 109 wells by 2025 as stated in plan filed to CalGEM

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 13
GAS SYSTEM INTERNAL INSPECTION STATUS
2012-2021
System Piggability

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY System Piggability	EOY Piggable Milage Total
1	2012													19.49%	1277
2	2013													21.88%	1433
3	2014													22.99%	1506
4	2015													24.11%	1580
5	2016													25.75%	1687
6	2017													28.03%	1836
7	2018													31.73%	2079
8	2019													35.48%	2325
9	2020													42.55%	2788
10	2021													46.08%	2957

(a) Piggability % is dynamic since the Current system total mileage changes over the course of the year.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 14

DART RATE

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	0.42	0.56	0.58	0.63	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.69	0.63	0.60	0.63	0.63
2	2013	0.32	0.60	0.82	1.01	0.96	0.99	0.98	1.03	0.98	0.99	0.96	0.94	0.94
3	2014	0.27	0.19	0.28	0.38	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.86	0.94	0.98	1.05	1.05
4	2015	0.23	0.59	0.72	0.70	0.73	1.11	1.25	1.33	1.39	1.46	1.53	1.52	1.52
5	2016	0.57	1.41	1.39	1.31	1.33	1.31	1.35	1.51	1.58	1.52	1.59	1.70	1.70
6	2017	0.36	0.83	1.05	1.61	1.90	1.89	2.03	2.03	2.01	2.02	1.99	1.99	1.99
7	2018	1.22	1.30	1.29	1.47	1.56	1.51	1.65	1.74	1.81	1.78	1.74	1.81	1.81
8	2019	0.65	0.98	1.43	1.66	1.76	1.89	1.96	2.09	2.01	2.03	2.04	2.05	2.05
9	2020	0.76	1.44	1.34	1.30	1.19	1.17	1.22	1.37	1.31	1.36	1.37	1.34	1.34
10	2021	0.36	0.76	0.78	0.94	1.05	1.13	1.07	1.02	0.98	1.02	1.02	1.01	1.01

(a) Change in reporting process in 2016 which resulted in earlier classification
(b) Rates are company-wide
(c) Rates are cumulative

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 15A
Rate of EMPLOYEE SIF Actual using EEI SCL Model
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY	EOY Rate SPM (SCL model)	EOY Labor Hours
1	2012															
2	2013															
3	2014															
4	2015															
5	2016															
6	2017	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.01	46,859,884
7	2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.00	45,913,811
8	2019	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	46,684,596
9	2020	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	4	0.02	49,672,365
10	2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	51,877,570

(a) PG&E started tracking Employee SIF Actuals using the EEI SCL Model in 2017.

Labor hours by Month

Years	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
2017	3,896,332	3,771,980	4,333,833	3,765,548	4,251,370	4,004,976	3,517,755	4,135,723	3,745,093	4,308,181	3,687,157	3,441,936
2018	3,598,158	3,610,153	4,120,015	3,755,744	3,963,225	3,745,561	3,670,275	4,221,669	3,549,021	4,264,909	4,117,251	3,297,829
2019	3,707,483	3,823,635	3,939,982	3,934,898	3,955,218	3,654,569	3,867,271	3,984,534	3,793,849	4,686,374	3,595,922	3,740,862
2020	3,673,876	3,681,169	4,145,234	4,038,426	3,761,387	4,256,322	4,421,339	4,334,463	4,573,318	4,882,418	3,694,751	4,209,662
2021	3,839,472	4,020,854	4,883,961	4,466,083	4,094,847	4,471,078	4,233,635	4,554,241	4,353,125	4,468,465	3,940,192	4,393,539

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 15B
Rate of EMPLOYEE SIF Actual using OSHA definition
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY	EOY Rate	EOY Labor Hours
1	2012	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	7	0.03	42,370,076
2	2013	0	3	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	9	0.04	43,898,780
3	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.01	45,772,256
4	2015	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	0.02	46,832,638
5	2016	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	4	0.02	48,269,076
6	2017	1	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.03	46,859,884
7	2018	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	0.01	45,913,811
8	2019	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0.02	46,684,596
9	2020	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	6	0.02	49,672,365
10	2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.00	51,877,570

Labor hours by Month

Years	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
2017	3,896,332	3,771,980	4,333,833	3,765,548	4,251,370	4,004,976	3,517,755	4,135,723	3,745,093	4,308,181	3,687,157	3,441,936
2018	3,598,158	3,610,153	4,120,015	3,755,744	3,963,225	3,745,561	3,670,275	4,221,669	3,549,021	4,264,909	4,117,251	3,297,829
2019	3,707,483	3,823,635	3,939,982	3,934,898	3,955,218	3,654,569	3,867,271	3,984,534	3,793,849	4,686,374	3,595,922	3,740,862
2020	3,673,876	3,681,169	4,145,234	4,038,426	3,761,387	4,256,322	4,421,339	4,334,463	4,573,318	4,882,418	3,694,751	4,209,662
2021	3,839,472	4,020,854	4,883,961	4,466,083	4,094,847	4,471,078	4,233,635	4,554,241	4,353,125	4,468,465	3,940,192	4,393,539

Rates

Years	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
2017	0.051	0.106	0.000	0.106	0.000	0.050	0.057	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
2018	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.047	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.061
2019	0.054	0.052	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.056	0.000
2020	0.054	0.000	0.048	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.092	0.000	0.000	0.054	0.048
2021	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.046	0.000	0.000	0.000

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 16A
Rate of CONTRACTOR SIF Actual using EEI SCL Model
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY Rate
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016													
6	2017													0.01
7	2018													0.02
8	2019													0.01
9	2020	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.10	0.00	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.03
10	2021	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.02

(a) PG&E started tracking Contractor SIF Actuals using the EEI SCL Model in 2017 annually and 2020 monthly.

SIF A Counts

Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY Total
2017				1						1			2
2018		1						1	1				3
2019						1	2						3
2020	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	2	1	0	0	8
2021	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	6

Labor Hours

Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY Total
2017													35,549,334
2018													37,533,432
2019													45,602,936
2020	4,679,580	4,184,702	4,092,337	3,362,517	3,705,474	3,957,041	3,902,279	4,148,883	5,155,493	5,213,213	4,522,152	3,803,737	50,727,409
2021	3,694,147	3,572,311	4,088,318	4,342,521	4,243,240	4,892,206	4,875,056	5,699,173	6,406,370	6,753,807	5,964,609	6,086,095	60,617,853

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 16B
Rate of CONTRACTOR SIF Actual using OSHA definition
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY	EOY Rate	EOY Labor Hours
1	2012	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	0	1	0	1	0	8		
2	2013	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	5		
3	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
4	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2		
5	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		
6	2017	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.02	35,549,334
7	2018	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	4	0.02	37,533,432
8	2019	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.03	45,602,936
9 (a)	2020	0	0	1	0	0	4	2	0	5	1	0	1	14	0.06	50,727,409
10	2021	0	1	2	2	3	3	0	0	0	1	1	0	13	0.04	60,617,853

(a) Four additional SIF events were added to July and September for 2020. There was a gap in the process which resulted in under-reported incidents at the end of the year.

Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY Total
2019	2,806,768	3,050,589	3,330,635	3,429,181	3,948,334	3,716,684	3,905,669	4,507,574	4,031,132	4,477,318	4,370,348	4,028,703	45,602,936
2020	4,679,580	4,184,702	4,092,337	3,362,517	3,705,474	3,957,041	3,902,279	4,148,883	5,155,493	5,213,213	4,522,152	3,803,737	50,727,409
2021	3,694,147	3,572,311	4,088,318	4,342,521	4,243,240	4,892,206	4,875,056	5,699,173	6,406,370	6,753,807	5,964,609	6,086,095	60,617,853

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 17

RATE OF SIF POTENTIAL - EMPLOYEE

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016													
6	2017	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.16	0.19	0.25	0.06	0.19	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.17	0.13
7	2018	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.05	0.00	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.09
8	2019	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.20	0.25	0.27	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.22	0.05	0.14
9	2020	0.05	0.27	0.10	0.05	0.16	0.00	0.14	0.09	0.00	0.04	0.22	0.10	0.10
10	2021	0.10	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.00	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.05	0.18	0.09

(a) Rates are monthly
(b) PG&E started tracking Employee SIF Potentials in 2017

SIF P Counts

Years	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
2017	2	2	2	3	4	5	1	4	1	3	1	3	31
2018	1	1	2	2	1	0	3	3	3	2	2	1	21
2019	3	3	2	4	5	5	1	1	1	3	4	1	33
2020	1	5	2	1	3	0	3	2	0	1	4	2	24
2021	2	0	1	2	0	3	3	2	2	3	1	4	23

Labor hours by Month

Years	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
2017	3,896,332	3,771,980	4,333,833	3,765,548	4,251,370	4,004,976	3,517,755	4,135,723	3,745,093	4,308,181	3,687,157	3,441,936	46,859,884
2018	3,598,158	3,610,153	4,120,015	3,755,744	3,963,225	3,745,561	3,670,275	4,221,669	3,549,021	4,264,909	4,117,251	3,297,829	45,913,811
2019	3,707,483	3,823,635	3,939,982	3,934,898	3,955,218	3,654,569	3,867,271	3,984,534	3,793,849	4,686,374	3,595,922	3,740,862	46,684,596
2020	3,673,876	3,681,169	4,145,234	4,038,426	3,761,387	4,256,322	4,421,339	4,334,463	4,573,318	4,882,418	3,694,751	4,209,662	49,672,365
2021	3,839,472	4,020,854	4,883,961	4,466,083	4,094,847	4,471,078	4,233,635	4,554,241	4,353,125	4,468,465	3,940,192	4,393,539	51,877,570

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 18
RATE OF SIF POTENTIAL - CONTRACTOR
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016													
6	2017													
7	2018													
8	2019													
9	2020						0.30	0.10	0.14	0.08	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.09
10	2021	0.11	0.00	0.10	0.09	0.24	0.29	0.00	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.03	0.16	0.12

(a) PG&E started tracking Contractor SIF Potentials in June of 2020
(b) Rates are monthly

Contractor SIF P Counts

Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
2020						6	2	3	2	0	1	0	14
2021	2	0	2	2	5	7	0	4	4	4	1	5	36

Contractor Hours Worked

Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
2020						3,957,041	3,902,279	4,148,883	5,155,493	5,213,213	4,522,152	3,803,737	30,702,798
2021	3,694,147	3,572,311	4,088,318	4,342,521	4,243,240	4,892,206	4,875,056	5,699,173	6,406,370	6,753,807	5,964,609	6,086,095	60,617,853

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 19
CONTRACTOR DART CASE RATE
2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY Avg.
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016													
6	2017	0.73	0.22	0.68	0.41	0.74	0.46	0.90	0.44	0.58	0.33	0.81	0.47	0.56
7	2018	0.85	1.21	0.95	0.54	0.14	0.44	0.50	0.57	0.83	0.37	0.47	0.39	0.61
8	2019	0.36	0.13	0.49	0.65	0.77	0.55	0.58	0.27	0.51	0.60	0.25	0.43	0.47
9	2020	0.34	0.43	0.15	0.24	0.22	0.71	0.77	0.34	0.78	0.42	0.22	0.37	0.42
10	2021	0.27	0.22	0.44	0.18	0.42	0.16	0.16	0.11	0.09	0.33	0.20	0.12	0.22

(a) ISNetworld program implementation began in 2017
(b) Data is self-reported for PG&E performance work

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 20

PUBLIC SIF

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
2	2012	2	3	4	1	5	3	3	1	6	3	1	2	34
3	2013	2	1	4	5	1	7	5	6	1	3	4	3	42
4	2014	1	4	4	5	8	1	8	6	4	4	9	10	64
5	2015	1	6	3	8	3	9	5	7	6	4	5	2	59
6	2016	2	0	3	5	5	3	3	4	2	3	1	0	31
7	2017	2	0	3	2	0	2	4	4	2	3	3	1	26
8	2018		5	2	1	4	1	1	1	2	0	88	1	106
9	2019	4	1	2	1	2	3	4	2	3	5	2	2	31
10	2020		0	2	1	2	2	2		1	3	2	2	17
11	2021	1	1	0	6	2	2	0	6	1	0	1	0	20

(a) Regarding wildfire fatality reporting, for 2015 through 2021 PG&E is including data for fires CAL FIRE concluded were caused by PG&E equipment. Wildfire fatality data for 2011 through 2014 is based on reportable incidents as defined in Appendix B to D.06-04-055 and CPUC Resolution E-4184.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 21

HELICOPTER / FLIGHT ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013								1					1
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016													
6	2017							1						1
7	2018													
8	2019													
9	2020						1	1						2
10	2021													

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 22

PERCENTAGE OF SIF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED ON TIME

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016													
6	2017				100%	100%	100%	87%	94%	100%	100%	96%	100%	100%
7	2018	100%	100%	100%	100%	96%	97%	96%	95%	92%	93%	93%	93%	93%
8	2019	69%	89%	91%	95%	95%	96%	96%	97%	95%	95%	93%	94%	94%
9	2020	86%	75%	65%	72%	68%	71%	72%	78%	78%	79%	80%	79%	79%
10	2021	72%	86%	92%	92%	95%	95%	94%	95%	96%	96%	97%	97%	97%

(a) Tracking began in 2017

(b) Percentages are cumulative

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 23

HARD BRAKE RATE

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.0
6	2017	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6
7	2018	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6
8	2019	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
9	2020	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
10	2021	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6

(a) Rates were not tracked until 2016

(b) Rates are cumulative

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 24

DRIVER'S CALL COMPLAINT RATE

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012													
2	2013													
3	2014													
4	2015													
5	2016	12.8	11.0	10.6	10.7	10.3	10.1	10.2	10.3	10.5	10.2	10.2	10.0	10.0
6	2017	6.5	7.9	8.5	8.2	8.4	8.6	8.4	9.4	9.7	8.0	7.9	8.0	8.0
7	2018	7.7	8.2	9.3	8.8	8.4	7.7	7.3	8.4	8.3	8.1	8.0	8.0	8.0
8	2019	5.4	6.2	6.3	5.7	5.8	6.0	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.1	5.9	5.9
9	2020	5.1	5.3	5.3	4.8	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
10	2021	2.6	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.7	2.7	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.5

(a) Rates were not tracked until 2016

(b) Rates are cumulative

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 25A

DISTRIBUTION WIRES-DOWN NOT RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC DE-ENERGIZATION (ANNUAL)

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2	2013	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	2014	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4	2015	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5	2016	9.2%	14.2%	12.1%	14.3%	9.9%	15.8%	13.2%	15.3%	14.6%	14.4%	15.1%	9.0%	12.7%
6	2017	7.5%	7.2%	8.8%	9.5%	14.3%	12.3%	14.6%	18.0%	14.4%	9.0%	12.4%	13.5%	9.6%
7	2018	10.3%	7.6%	10.1%	14.9%	16.6%	17.1%	11.3%	19.1%	14.7%	14.9%	15.1%	12.0%	13.4%
8	2019	11.5%	8.6%	13.6%	12.9%	11.1%	15.3%	14.4%	13.6%	11.7%	14.4%	9.9%	13.0%	11.2%
9	2020	13.1%	11.1%	10.0%	16.7%	23.3%	23.2%	22.9%	17.5%	18.2%	18.3%	17.5%	9.2%	15.9%
10	2021	8.6%	14.3%	20.8%	18.0%	13.1%	18.6%	21.5%	21.6%	16.8%	18.1%	19.6%	7.7%	13.1%

(a) PG&E updated its reporting tools and began reporting energized distribution wire down events starting in 2015 with 2016 being the first full year reporting these events.

(b) For safety reasons, field personnel generally treat wire down events an energized if unknown and these percentages represent the information reported as actually being energized.

TABLE 25B

TRANSMISSION WIRES-DOWN NOT RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC DE-ENERGIZATION (ANNUAL)

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2	2013	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	2014	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4	2015	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%
5	2016	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.4%
6	2017	5.9%	13.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%
7	2018	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.3%
8	2019	12.5%	3.7%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%
9	2020	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	4.5%
10	2021	3.7%	33.3%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	25.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	3.8%	8.8%

(a) Based on outages where the circuit was manually de-energized without securing in advance approval from CAISO (emergency force out)

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 26A

MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS

2015-2021

Transmission Patrols

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1														
2														
3														
4	2015	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
5	2016	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
6	2017	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	2018	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	2019	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	2020	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	2021	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%

(a) PG&E did not track this metric until 2015

TABLE 26B

MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS

2015-2021

Transmission Inspections

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1														
2														
3														
4	2015	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
5	2016	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
6	2017	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	2018	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	2019	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	2020	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	2021	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.03%

(a) PG&E did not track this metric until 2015

TABLE 26C
MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS
2015-2021
Distribution Patrols

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1														
2														
3														
4	2015	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
5	2016	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
6	2017	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	2018	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	2019	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	2020	0.00%	0.00%	2.37%	26.42%	25.94%	36.51%	29.84%	31.15%	28.74%	28.96%	10.09%	0.00%	20.66%
10	2021	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	68.97%	41.28%	27.21%	2.88%	9.88%	15.88%	6.74%	1.38%	0.00%	10.78%

(a) PG&E did not track this metric until 2015

TABLE 26D
MISSED INSPECTIONS AND PATROLS FOR ELECTRIC CIRCUITS
2015-2021
Distribution Inspections

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1														
2														
3														
4	2015	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
5	2016	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.22%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%
6	2017	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.42%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%
7	2018	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	2019	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	2020	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	98.84%	89.78%	65.47%	40.62%	24.99%	15.31%	9.20%	1.59%	0.00%	26.22%
10	2021	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	47.28%	59.33%	41.85%	20.48%	5.16%	5.90%	6.85%	4.23%	28.50%	16.31%

(a) PG&E did not track this metric until 2015

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 27

OVERHEAD CONDUCTOR SIZE IN HIGH FIRE THREAT DISTRICT, TIERS 2 AND 3, (HFTD)

TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION (T&D) OVERHEAD WIRES DOWN

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	233	191	427	247	176	231	206	200	146	203	395	377	3032
2	2013	163	179	192	225	225	209	176	207	203	237	160	219	2395
3	2014	168	302	246	193	178	181	194	189	163	221	182	399	2616
4	2015	158	237	143	185	154	198	184	225	189	218	274	410	2575
5	2016	430	184	511	270	225	211	224	178	213	343	219	292	3300
6	2017	283	376	378	242	263	238	233	215	230	205	246	158	3067
7	2018	216	175	370	231	210	231	272	205	168	213	208	288	2787
8	2019	336	249	336	238	311	207	198	210	216	138	232	342	3013
9	2020	159	172	245	229	235	213	196	240	192	180	237	196	2494
10	2021	262	188	292	174	217	238	213	181	208	255	248	268	2744

(a) PG&E has utilized its Integrated Logging Information System-Operations Data Base (ILIS-ODB) to provide the number of distribution outages that involved distribution wire down event conditions.

(b) Distribution wire down conditions during PSPS events are not included in these totals since these typically occur when the lines are de-energized and are generally not the initiating cause of the reported outage event.

(c) PG&E's current definition for distribution wire down events are only related to sustained outages of its primary distribution system reported in its ILIS-ODB data base.

(d) Transmission wire down events were not tracked until 2012.

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
TABLE 28A
GAS OPERATION CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BACKLOG (ANNUAL)
2012-2021
GAS DISTRIBUTION

Line No.	Year	Overdue Work Orders	Total Work orders	EOY
1	2012	186	4471	0.04
2	2013	87	6000	0.01
3	2014	8	6531	0.00
4	2015	74	7234	0.01
5	2016	2	7127	0.00
6	2017	22	4419	0.00
7	2018	48	4803	0.01
8	2019	37	24698	0.00
9	2020	74	11675	0.01
10	2021	324	13067	0.02

TABLE 28B
GAS OPERATION CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BACKLOG (ANNUAL)
2012-2021
GAS TRANSMISSION

Line No.	Year	Overdue Work Orders	Total Work orders	EOY
1	2012	1	434	0.00
2	2013	1	541	0.00
3	2014	0	416	0.00
4	2015	17	404	0.04
5	2016	0	957	0.00
6	2017	0	518	0.00
7	2018	9	829	0.01
8	2019	10	559	0.02
9	2020	20	716	0.03
10	2021	32	977	0.03

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 29

GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (TIERS 2 AND 3, HFTD)

2012-2021

DISTRIBUTION, TRANSMISSION AND VEGETATION MANAGEMENT

	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
Distribution	2012													
	2013													
	2014													
	2015													
	2016													
	2017													
	2018													
	2019													
	2020	23%	30%	15%	12%	18%	28%	9%	19%	27%	16%	9%	12%	15%
	2021	7%	5%	21%	18%	11%	13%	15%	17%	22%	19%	18%	25%	16%
Transmission	2012													
	2013													
	2014													
	2015													
	2016													
	2017													
	2018													
	2019													
	2020	71%	67%	68%	72%	76%	75%	77%	77%	75%	54%	34%	30%	70%
	2021	31%	39%	51%	55%	65%	52%	64%	78%	58%	45%	24%	33%	49%
Vegetation Management	2012													
	2013													
	2014													
	2015													
	2016													
	2017													
	2018													
	2019													
	2020	98%	98%	84%	91%	94%	96%	96%	96%	92%	89%	88%	85%	92%
	2021	94%	95%	92%	94%	94%	91%	94%	96%	95%	96%	97%	98%	95%

(a) PG&E's history of available data, which is recorded in our electric work management systems (e.g. SAP) goes back to 2010. However, we are focusing our historical reporting for this metric starting at 2020 due to various changes that occurred prior to 2020, which reshaped GO 95 and GO 165 to include boundaries for HFTD, as well as informed our current inspection methods to be more enhanced towards identifying ignition risks

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 30

GAS LARGE OVERPRESSURE EVENTS

2012-2021

Number of Large OP Events

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	7
2	2013	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	8
3	2014	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	7
4	2015	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	5
5	2016	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	1	0	2	1	1	10
6	2017	1	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	4	0	0	11
7	2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	5
8	2019	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	11
9	2020	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	3	1	0	0	0	9
10	2021	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	5

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 31

GAS IN-LINE INSPECTIONS MISSED

2012-2021

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	2017	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	2019	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	2020	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	2021	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

TABLE 32

OVERHEAD CONDUCTOR SAFETY INDEX (ANNUAL)

2012-2021

A) T&D Wire Down Events (non MED)

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	233	191	427	247	176	231	206	200	146	203	395	377	3032
2	2013	163	179	192	225	225	209	176	207	203	237	160	219	2395
3	2014	168	302	246	193	178	181	194	189	163	221	182	399	2616
4	2015	158	237	143	185	154	198	184	225	189	219	274	410	2576
5	2016	430	184	511	270	225	211	224	178	213	343	219	292	3300
6	2017	283	376	378	242	263	238	233	215	230	205	246	158	3067
7	2018	216	175	370	231	210	231	272	204	168	213	208	287	2785
8	2019	335	249	336	238	311	206	198	210	216	138	232	341	3010
9	2020	159	172	245	229	235	213	196	240	192	180	237	196	2494
10	2021	262	188	292	174	217	238	213	181	208	255	248	265	2741

B) T&D Wire Down Events (non MED)/Total Circuit Miles

Line No.	Year	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	EOY
1	2012	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.031
2	2013	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.024
3	2014	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.026
4	2015	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.026
5	2016	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.033
6	2017	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.031
7	2018	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.028
8	2019	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.030
9	2020	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.025
10	2021	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.028

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT

ATTACHMENT B

REPORT METRIC 22 – PUBLIC SIF SUBCATEGORIES

PER SPD REQUEST

2021 SAFETY PERFORMANCE METRICS REPORT
REPORT METRIC 22 - PUBLIC SIF SUBCATEGORIES PER SPD REQUEST

Event Date	Description	SED Subcategories	Total Fatalities
1/25/2021	Third-party Contact with energized line	Overhead Electric Contact - With overhead conductors	1
4/1/2021	PG&E vehicle struck struck the 3rd Party pedestrian who was jaywalking which resulted in a 3rd Party fatality.	Vehicle Related	1
4/15/2021	Car/pole accident resulting in one fatality	Vehicle Related	1
4/29/2021	Car/pole accident resulting in three fatalities and one serious injury	Vehicle Related	3
5/7/2021	Car/pole accident resulting in one fatality	Vehicle Related	1
6/5/2021	Unknown 3rd party struck by Contractor Rokstad employee resulting in fatality	Vehicle Related	1
7/1/2021	Head on collision between PG&E driver and third party	Vehicle Related	1
7/22/2021	Third-party climbed tower and touched insulator sustaining an electric shock	Overhead Electric Contact - With overhead conductors	1
8/14/2021	Single vehicle accident involving 3 individuals. 1 female (deceased), 1 male (life flighted to Sutter Roseville), 1 infant (flown to UC Davis.) Vehicle left the roadway rolling down the embankment. 1	Vehicle Related	1
11/24/2021	During the construction of a building under the span of existing conductors between two poles, a third-party fell through the roof onto a concrete floor which resulted in a fatality.	Other Non-Categorized Cause	1

Event Date	Description	SED Subcategories	Total Serious Injuries
4/29/2021	Car/pole accident resulting in three fatalities and one serious injury	Vehicle Related	1
5/23/2021	Third-party contact with metering equipment related to theft	Other Non-Categorized Cause	1
6/28/2021	Third party injured while fishing. Fell forward, head first into rocks above water line; sustained deep cut on head	Other Non-Categorized Cause	1
7/24/2021	Third party injury. Recreation boating activity, 2 people riding inflatable tube towed by boat struck a rock. One induvial was thrown from the tube, struck a rock injuring wrist. Likely that the incident is related to hazardous boating practices too close to the shoreline.	Other Non-Categorized Cause	1
8/7/2021	Dixie Fire Fighter injuries due to falling tree	Other Non-Categorized Cause	3
9/30/2021	Third-party Contact with energized line	Overhead Electric Contact - With overhead conductors	1